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Abstract
This article will deal with specific aspects of the divided-power system of the European Union
and provide a legal analysis concerning federalism issues in the European Union raised before the
Court of Justice that are similar to those in the United States. First, the article will reference recent
U.S. case law on federalism. The bulk of the Article will concentrate on the question of whether
and to what extent European Community (”EC”) directives, as legislative instruments, are capable
of mandating specific courses of action to be pursued on the local or regional level in Member
States. Next, the article will review case law from the Court of Justice that features the most
relevant cases regarding administrative obligations based upon Community law. Lastly, the article
will discuss the possible effects mandates by the Court of Justice might have on Member States
and will highlight some questions that case law on this issue has yet to resolve.
LOCAL ADMINISTRATION
AND THE BINDING NATURE OF
COMMUNITY DIRECTIVES: A LESSER
KNOWN SIDE OF EUROPEAN
LEGAL INTEGRATION
Kurt Riechenberg*
INTRODUCTION
Divided power or federal systems raise numerous legal ques-
tions regarding the right allocation of powers between the cen-
tral entity and its constituent parts, whether those powers are
legislative, executive, judicial, regulatory, or administrative. The
European Union is the most interesting and probably the only
international legal construction to be classified as a true divided
power system. In its landmark decision Van Gend en Loos,' the
Court of Justice held that the Community constitutes a "new
legal order of international law for the benefit of which States
had limited their sovereign rights."2
Many academic studies have examined the question of
whether the European Union can be compared to national fed-
eral systems such as the United States, Germany (sixteen
Linder), or Austria (nine Lander).' Due to recent constitu-
tional developments, Belgium (three regions) and Spain (seven-
teen Autonomous Communities) must be added to the list of
European countries with federal structures. In addition, there
are twenty regions in Italy.
* LL.M., Chef de cabinet, Chambers of the President, European Court of Justice.
All views expressed are personal. The author is indebted to Ms. Priscille Schiltz, Presi-
dent's Chambers, for her assistance.
1. Van Gend en Loos v. Neederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, Case 26/62,
[1963] E.C.R. 1, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. 105.
2. Id. at 12, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. at 129.
3. Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 Am. J. COMp.
L. 205 (1990); COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM: UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
(M. Tushnet ed., 1990); George Bermann, Taking Subsidiary Seriously: Federalism in the
European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994); Thomas J.
Fischer, Federalism in the European Community and the United States: A Rose by Any Other
Name, 17 Fomi-tAm INT'L L.J. 389 (1994); Manfred Zuleeg, What Holds a Nation Together?
Cohesion and Democracy in the United States of America and in the European Union, 45 AM. J.
COMP. L. 505 (1997).
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This Article will not add one more comparative study to that
body of legal writing. Rather, it will deal with specific aspects of
the divided-power system of the European Union. In order to
familiarize the reader with those aspects, a brief reference to re-
cent legal developments in the United States will be made. The
purpose of this reference is also to offer the European reader a
short overview of U.S. case law raising similar conflicts to those
that are discussed by the author.
There have been several recent noteworthy developments in
the U.S. Supreme Court's case law on federalism. These cases
concern the ability of the federal government to legislate in mat-
ters affecting interstate commerce, to authorize suits against
states in federal court, to protect individuals' constitutional
rights from state encroachment, and to regulate and direct State
officials.4 The key case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court re-
garding the reach of federal laws into state administration is
Printz v. United States,5 which provides an interesting example of
the regulation of state officials for European law.
The cases previously decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in
this area have covered a wide range of issues such as the location
of a state capital,6 application of labor standards such as mini-
mum wage and overpay requirements to state and municipal em-
ployees,7 the status of common law,' and the regulation of the
disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within a state.9
In Printz, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a federal re-
quirement that state police officers conduct background checks
on prospective gun purchasers. The U.S. Supreme Court relied
on the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to hold that
the U.S. Congress could not direct state officials to carry out a
federal program. The majority held that while state judges can
be required to enforce federal laws, such an obligation can not
be placed on state executive officers. Justice Scalia, writing for
4. See Evan Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer
State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1001 (1995); see also Steven
Calabresi, A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers: In Defense of United States v.
Lopez, 94 MICH. L. Rv. 752 (1995).
5. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
6. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
7. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
8. Griffin v. Beckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
9. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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the majority, derived support for the enlistment of state judges
into federal service from the structure of Article III and the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, adding that "unlike
legislatures and executives, [courts] applied the law of other sov-
ereigns all the time." 10 Imposition of a similar requirement on
state executive officers, in contrast, would violate the Constitu-
tion's "essential postulate[s]," such as the "system of dual sover-
eignty.""1 The majority concluded that "the Federal Govern-
ment may neither issue directives requiring the States to address
particular problems, nor command the States' officers" to "ad-
dress particular problems." The majority also determined that
the Federal Government could not require states to "administer
or enforce a federal regulatory program." In addition, the U.S.
Supreme Court suggested that it was not necessary to weigh "the
burdens or benefits" of each case because "such commands are
fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of
dual sovereignty.' 12
The principal dissent, authored by Justice Stevens, argued
that the political safeguards of federalism protect the system of
dual sovereignty as long as Congress acts within the scope of an
enumerated power.' 3 In a separate dissent, Justice Breyer added
that other countries, facing similar questions of democratic ac-
countability and the need for a balance between central and lo-
cal authority, have come to different conclusions. Specifically,
the dissent argued that the "federal systems of Switzerland, Ger-
many, and the European Union" provide that "constituent
states, not federal bureaucracies, will themselves implement
many of the laws, rules, regulations, or decrees enacted by the
central 'federal' body." The dissent argued that constituent
states implement many such laws "because they believe that such
a system interferes less, not more, with the independent author-
ity of the 'state,' member nation, or other subsidiary govern-
ment, and helps to safeguard individual liberty as well."' 4
Justice Scalia's majority opinion, however, rejected Justice
Breyer's comparative analysis as "inappropriate to the task of in-
terpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite relevant
10. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2371.
11. Id. at 2376.
12. Id. at 2384.
13. Id. at 2386.
14. Id. at 2404.
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to the task of writing one.' 15
This Article offers a legal analysis concerning similar feder-
alism issues in the European Union raised before the Court of
Justice. It is hoped that this discussion catches the attention of
those having a good knowledge of European law as well as those
who are more focused on comparisons of "divided power" sys-
tems. 6 This Article concentrates on the question of whether
and to what extent European Community ("EC") directives as
legislative instruments are capable of mandating specific courses
of action to be pursued on the local or regional level in Member
States.
The choice of this topic has been influenced by the fact that
extensive legal scholarship has thus far been devoted to ques-
tions dealing with the limitation of legislative powers between
European institutions and Member States, 17 the proper legisla-
tive implementation of European law by Member States, 8 and
the judicial interpretation and application of European law.' 9
Less attention has been paid to situations in which European
legislation strives to commandeer state administration, including
regional and local entities.
European case law provides instructive examples of tech-
niques and legal instruments to be used by local or regional ad-
ministrations to comply with precise requirements of Commu-
nity directives. It follows from the rulings of the European Com-
munity's Court of Justice that, depending on the issue involved,
domestic administrative bodies have to disregard conflicting na-
tional law, to go beyond those rules, or to abstain from action.
The cases discussed relate to EC directives in the fields of envi-
ronmental protection, public procurement, public security, and
the recognition of foreign diplomas. Among all those fields, EC
directives concerning environmental protection provide the best
15. Id. at 2377.
16. For a general introduction, see Deirdre Curtin, The Constitutional Structure of the
Union, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 17 (1933).
17. Paul D. Marquardt, Subsidiary and Sovereignty in the European Union, 18 FoRDHAm
INr'L L.J. 616 (1994); Alan Dashwood, The Limits of European Community Powers, 21 EUR.
L. REv. 113 (1996).
18. INGOLF PERNICE, HARMONIZATION OF LEGISLATION IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS: CONSTI-
TUTIONAL, FEDERAL AND SUBSIDIARrY ASPECTS-THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERIKA COMPARED (1996).
19. Virginia Harrison, Subsidiary in Article 3B of the European Community Treaty: Gob-
bledegook orJusticiable Principle?, 45 INT'L & COMp. LQ. 431 (1996).
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examples for the issues discussed in this Article. They also offer
interesting starting points for legal comparisons.2 °
I. BASIC FEATURES OF THE COMMUNITY LEGAL ORDER
In its 1964 Costa ruling,21 the Court of Justice held that "the
integration into the laws of each Member State of provisions
which derive from the Community, and more generally the
terms and the spirit of the EC Treaty make it impossible for the
States, as a corollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and
subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them on a
basis of reciprocity." The Court of Justice, continuing, deter-
mined that "the law stemming from the EC Treaty, an independ-
ent source of law, [cannot] because of its special and original
nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however
framed. 22
Regarding the obligations of state courts flowing from those
principles, the Court of Justice in its Simmenthaljudgment,2 de-
clared that "a national court which is called upon, within the
limits of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of Community law"
must "give full effect to those provisions on national legislation,
even if adopted subsequently." The Court of Justice also deter-
mined that "it is not necessary for the court to request or await a
prior setting aside of such provision by legislative or other consti-
tutional means."2 4
Community law thus requires that national authorities not
apply a domestic rule recognized as incompatible with the EC
Treaty establishing the European Community25 ("EC Treaty"),
20. Richard Stewart, Environmental Law in the United States and the European Commu-
nity: Spillovers, Cooperation, Rivalry, Institutions, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 41; David Geradin,
Free Trade and Environmental Protection in an Integrated Market: A Survey of the Case Law of
the United States Supreme Court and the European Court ofJustice, 2 FLA. ST. U. J. TRANSNAT.
L. & POL'Y 141 (1993); ClionaJ.M. Kimber, A Comparison of Environmental Protection in
the United States and the European Union, 54 MD. L. REV. 1658 (1995).
21. Costa v. ENEL (Ente Nazionale L'Energia Elettrica), Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R.
585, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R. 425.
22. Id. at 593-94, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R. at 455.
23. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, Case 106/77,
[1978] E.C.R. 629, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 263.
24. Id. at 644, 24, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 284.
25. Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719
[hereinafter TEU].
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and, if the circumstances so require, take all appropriate meas-
ures to enable Community law to be fully applied. Until now,
the Court of Justice has upheld those rulings by recognizing
supremacy and the direct effect of Community law with respect
to a wide range of EC Treaty provisions, especially in the area of
the economic freedoms of the common market.26 National
courts are therefore bound to provide the necessary legal protec-
tion for individuals. Accordingly, national rules of procedure
must be applied in such a way as to prevent the individual rights
created by the Community legal order from being unduly re-
stricted.2 7
In the Factortame case, 8 the Court of Justice took protection
of federal rights in state courts even further. The House of
Lords had requested a preliminary ruling on the question of
whether a national court is required to grant interim relief by
suspending the application of a national statute in order to pro-
tect rights claimed under Community law, where that form of
interim relief was not available under domestic law. The Court
of Justice answered in the following way:
Any provision of a national legal system and any legislative,
administrative or judicial practice which might impair the ef-
fectiveness of Community law by withholding from the na-
tional court having jurisdiction to apply such law the power to
do everything necessary at the moment of its application to
set aside national legislative provisions, which might prevent,
even temporarily, Community rules from having full force
and effect are incompatible with those requirements, which
are the very essence of Community law .... [T]he full effec-
tiveness of Community law would be just as much impaired if
26. Denkavit Futtermittel GmbH v. Minister fur Ernaehrung, Landwirtschaft und
Forsten des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 251/78, [1979] E.C.R. 3369, [1980] 3
C.M.L.R. 513; Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case 178/84, [1987] E.C.R.
1227, [1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 780; RT T v. GB-Inno-BM, Case C-18/88, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5941,
1-5982-83, 30; UNECTEF v. Heylens, Case 222/86, [1987] E.C.R. 4097, [1989] 1
C.M.L.R. 901, 929; Jean Reyners v. Belgium, Case 2/74, [1974] E.C.R. 631, 652, 1 52,
[1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 305; Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de
Metaalnijverheid, Case 33/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1299, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298.
27. Comet BV v. Produktschap voor Siergenassen, Case 45/76, [1976] E.C.R. 2043,
2053, 7 12-16, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 533, 553; Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH and
Rewe-Markt Steffen v. Hauptzollamt Kiel, Case 158/80, [1981] E.C.R. 1805, [1982] 1
C.M.L.R. 449; Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. San Giorgio SpA, Case 199/
82, [1983] E.C.R. 3595, 3613, 14, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 658, 689.
28. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd., Case C-
213/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2433, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1.
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a rule of national law could prevent a court seized of a dis-
pute governed by Community law from granting interim re-
lief in order to ensure the full effectiveness of the judgment
to be given on the existence of the rights claimed under Com-
munity law. It follows that a court which in those circum-
stances would grant interim relief, if it were not for a rule of
national law, is obliged to set aside that rule.29
Regarding the question of state liability for violations of
Community law, the Court of Justice in its 1960 judgment in
Humblet,3 ° stated that "[where] a legislative or administrative
measure adopted by the authorities of a Member State is con-
trary to Community law, that Member State is obliged, . . . to
rescind the measure in question and to make reparation for any
unlawful consequences which may have ensued." 31 Sixteen years
later, the Court of Justice developed this concept in its Russo
judgment, 2 where it held that "[i]f such damage has been
caused through an infringement of Community law the State is
liable to the injured party for the consequences in the context of
the provisions of national law on the liability of the State."33
The full recognition of the principle of state liability for vio-
lations of Community law was expressed in the 1991 Francovich
decision.34 States now have to pay damages for losses incurred as
a result of a breach of Community law. In that ruling, the Court
of Justice also set out the conditions under which compensation
must be paid by Member States for those legal violations. The
provision in question must involve the grant of a right to individ-
uals. The relevant rule must sufficiently identify the contents of
those rights. There must be a causal link between the breach of
the provision by the state and the harm suffered by the individ-
ual. The central holding of this judgment is as follows:
The full effectiveness of the Community regulations would
be challenged, and the protection of the rights that they
recognize would be weakened, if individuals did not have
29. Id. at 1-2473-74, 20-21, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 29.
30. Humblet v. Belgian State, Case 6/60, [1960] 1 E.C.R. 559.
31. Id. at 569.
32. Russo v. Azienda di Stato per-gli Interventi sul Mercato Agricolo (AIMA), Case
60/75, [1976] E.C.R. 45, [1976 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8338.
33. Id. at 56, 9, [1976 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8338, at
7169.
34. Francovich & Bonafaci v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6-9/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5357,
[1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 66.
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the possibility of obtaining restitution when their rights are
encroached upon by a violation of Community law on the
part of a Member State. The possibility of obtaining restitu-
tion by the Member State is particularly vital when the full
effect of Community regulations is conditioned upon prior
action by the State, and when, consequently, in the absence
of such action individuals cannot enforce before the na-
tional jurisdictions the rights recognized as theirs by Com-
munity law. It is evident therefrom that the principle of the
responsibility of the State for damages caused to individuals
by the State's violations of Community law is inherent in the
EC Treaty system. 5
Five years later, the Court of Justice confirmed these princi-
ples in the Dillenkoferjudgment.36 In its 1996 ruling in the Brit-
ish Telecommunications case,3 7 the Court of Justice articulated
liability principles in circumstances where a Member State had
sought to implement a directive in national law but had done so
incorrectly. The Court of Justice held that in view of the legisla-
tive discretion accorded to national authorities in implementing
a directive, a Member State incurs liability on account of incor-
rect implementation only where the infringement is "sufficiently
serious." In other words, where a Member State has, in the exer-
cise of its legislative power, manifestly and gravely disregarded
the limits placed on the exercise of those powers, then it incurs
liability.
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNITY DIRECTIVES BY
MEMBER STATES
One of the key features of European legal integration is the
division between law-making functions of EC institutions and the
execution of EC laws by Member States. From the beginning of
European law-making, implementation gaps have impaired the
efficiency of the Community legal order.3' Failure to implement
35. Id. at 1-5414, 33-34, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. at 72.
36. Dillenkofer and Others v. Germany, Joined Cases, 178-79, 188-90/94, [1996]
E.C.R. 1-4845, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. 469.
37. Regina v. H.M. Treasury, ex parte British Telecommunications Plc., Case 392/
93, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1631, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 217.
38. Francis Snyder, The Effectiveness of European Community Law, 56 MoD. L. Rv. 19
(1993). Declaration No. 19 reads as follows:
1. The Conference stresses that it is central to the coherence and unity of the
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Community law takes many different forms depending on the
type of measure required to comply with those rules. 9 Under
Article 5 of the EC Treaty, however, Member States are under a
constitutional duty to give full effect to Community law.4" The
attainment of the objectives of the Community requires that the
rules of Community law established by the EC Treaty itself or
arising from procedures that it has instituted are fully applicable
at the same time and with identical effects over the whole terri-
tory of the Community.41 In addition, Member States must en-
sure that infringements of Community law are penalized under
the same conditions as similar violations of domestic law.4 2
Community legislation to be implemented and applied by
Member States takes two main forms, regulations and directives.
The Court of Justice has held that the provisions of a directive
must be implemented "with unquestionable binding force, preci-
sion and clarity in order to satisfy the requirements of legal cer-
tainty.'' 43 The Court of Justice illustrated this point in several
process of European construction that each Member State should fully and
accurately transpose into national law the Community directives addressed to
it within the deadlines laid down therein.
Moreover, the Conference, while recognizing that it must be for each Member
State to determine how the provisions of Community law can best be enforced
in the light of its own particular institutions, legal system and other circum-
stances, but in any event in compliance with Article 189 of the Treaty establish-
ing the European Community, considers it essential for the proper function-
ing of the Community that the measures taken by the different Member States
should result in Community law being applied with the same effectiveness and
rigour as in the- application of their national law.
2. The Conference calls on the Commission to ensure, in exercising its pow-
ers under Article 155 of this Treaty, that Member States fulfill their obliga-
tions. It asks the Commission to publish periodically a full report for the
Member States and the European Parliament.
TEU, supra note 25, Declaration on the implementation of Community law, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 786, 31 I.L.M. at 367.
39. Snyder, supra note 38, at 23 (citing "lack of incorporation or transposition,
enforcement, pre- and post-litigation non-compliance, legislative, executive and judicial
non-compliance, defiance, evasion and benign non-compliance").
40. EC Treaty, supra note 25, art. 5, OJ. C 224/1, at 9 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
591; seeJohn Temple Lang, Community Constitutional Law: Article 5 EEC Treaty, 27 COM-
MON MKT. L. Rv. 645 (1990).
41. Deirdre Curtin, The Decentralized Enforcement of Community Law Rights: Judicial
Snakes and Ladders, in CONSTiTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND NA-
TIONAL LAw: ESSAYS FOR THE HON. MR. JUSTICE T.F. O'HIGGINs 33 (1992).
42. Commission v. Greece, Case 68/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2965, 2984-85, 23-25,
[1991] 1 C.M.L.R. 31, 45-46.
43. Italy v. Commission, Case C-55/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-4813, 1-4872-73, 56; Fed-
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cases in which it rejected the German method of transposing
four environmental directives by means of administrative direc-
tives discussed in this Article. Article 189 of the EC Treaty states
that directives "shall leave to the national authorities the choice
of form and methods." It is settled case law that the freedom
that this provision gives Member States to choose the means by
which directives are implemented does not affect the obligation
to adopt in national legal systems all the measures necessary to
guarantee that directives are fully effective and to achieve the
results prescribed by Community law.44
The Court of Justice held that the transposition of a direc-
tive into domestic law could either be realized by formal and
express incorporation in specific legislation or through the ap-
plication of a general legal context
provided that it does indeed guarantee the full application of
the directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner so
that, where the directive is intended to create rights for indi-
viduals, the persons concerned can ascertain the full extent
of their rights and, where appropriate, rely on them before
the national courts.45
Because the German circulars did not confer individual rights,
Germany was held not to have fulfilled its obligations under the
EC Treaty.
It follows from those judgments that every time a directive
contains provisions that create rights and obligations for individ-
uals, legislative implementation has to be realized in such a way
that the potential beneficiaries of Community directives are ca-
pable of knowing their rights so that they may invoke them
eral Republic of Germany v. Commission, Case C-8/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2321, 1-2321, 1
13, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 409, 440 (emphasizing obligation of all national authorities, in-
cluding regional or local bodies to ensure respect of Community law). This ruling is of
particular relevance for those Member States that have delegated important rule-mak-
ing functions to lower levels of administration, such as Germany, Austria, Spain, and
Belgium.
44. Commission v. United Kingdom, Case C-337/89, [1992] E.C.R. 1-6103; Com-
mission v. United Kingdom, Case C-56/90, [1993] E.C.R. 1-4109, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 769.
45. Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case C-131/88, [1991] E.C.R. I-
825, 1-867, 1 6 (groundwater); Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case C-
361/88, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2567, 1-2600-01, 1 15, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 821, 854 (sulphur
dioxide and suspended particulates); Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany,
Case C-59/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2607, 1-2631, 18, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 821, 861 (lead
content of air); Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case C-58/89, [1991]
E.C.R. 1-4983, 1-5023, 1 13 (surface water).
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before administrative authorities. Regarding other types of di-
rectives, the Court of Justice has accepted that the transposition
of a directive may be operated in a "general legal context, '46 but
that faithful implementation is particularly important where
Member States are in charge of the management of a "common
heritage," such as the protection of migratory birds.47
As the Court of Justice provided in its judgment of May 25,
1982,48 each Member State is free to delegate powers to its do-
mestic authorities, as well as to implement directives by means of
measures adopted by regional or local authorities. That division
of powers, however, does not release the Member State from the
obligation to ensure that the provisions of the directives are
properly implemented in national law.4 9
All national authorities must decide whether to utilize cen-
tral bodies of the state or the entities of a federated state, or
other territorial administration. In addition, national authori-
ties must ensure that rules of Community law are observed
within the sphere of their competence. It is not for the Commu-
nity institutions to rule on the division of competence by the
institutional rules proper to each Member State.5 °
Thus, the Commission, under Article 169 of the EC Treaty,
may seek a declaration from the Court of Justice that a Member
State has failed to fulfill its obligations concerning the govern-
ment of the Member State in question, even if the failure to act
46. Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case 29/84, [1985] E.C.R. 1661,
[1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 579.
47. Commission v. Belgium, Case 247/85, [1987] E.C.R. 3029, 3060-61, 9, 1
C.E.C. (CCH) 175, 192; Commission v. France, Case 252/85, [1988] E.C.R. 2243, 2263,
5. On October 16, 1998, the Commission brought an action against France request-
ing the Court of Justice to declare that by failing to take all the necessary measures to
comply with the judgment of the Court ofJustice of April 27, 1988, in Case 252/85, the
French Republic has failed to fulfill its obligations under Article 171(1) of the EC
Treaty and to order the French Republic to pay a periodic penalty payment of
ECU105,500 per day in respect of each day as from the notification of the above men-
tioned judgment until it complies with its obligations, O.J. C 378/10 (1998).
48. Commission v. Netherlands, Case 96/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1791, [1981-1983
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8841; Commission v. Netherlands, Case
97/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1819, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8842.
49. Netherlands, [1982] E.C.R. at 1804-05, 12, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8841, at 7947-50; Netherlands, [1982] E.C.R. at 1833, 12,
[1981-1983 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8842, at 7957-60.
50. Federal Republic of Germany v. Commission, Case C-8/88, [1990] E.C.R. I-
2321, 1-2359, 13, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 409, 440.
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is the result of the action or omission of. the authorities of a re-
gion or a local entity.5' Member States are therefore fully re-
sponsible for actions of lower authorities that infringe Commu-
nity law.52 They may not invoke the regulatory powers of those
authorities to justify non-compliance with directives.53 Although
Member States may delegate rule-making functions to lower au-
thorities, they must provide for the necessary stipulations so that
directives are properly implemented.54 Member States may not
plead provisions, practices, or circumstances existing in its inter-
nal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with the
obligations and time-limits laid down in a directive. 5
This principle of responsibility has been explicitly con-
firmed for situations where independent regional and local enti-
ties were in violation of Community law. For example, the Court
of Justice held Belgium responsible for the insufficient imple-
mentation of Directive 80/778 relating to the quality of water
intended for human consumption. 6 The Court of Justice stated
that a decentralized authority, in this case the Walloon Region in
Belgium, must ensure the observance of the requirements of Di-
rective 80/778 in practice. The arguments concerning the cost
and complexity of the construction at the water treatment sta-
tion were not accepted by the Court ofJustice.57 In addition, the
Court of Justice emphasized that lower authorities are required
by national law to comply with European law and to fulfill cer-
tain reporting requirements established by environmental rules.
51. Commission v. Italy, Case C-33/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5987, 1-6008, 7 24, [1992] 2
C.M.L.R. 353, 367.
52. Commission v. Italy, Case 52/75, [1976] E.C.R. 277, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 320;
Commission v. Belgium, Case 77/69, [1970] E.C.R. 237; Commission v. Italy, Case 52/
75, [1976] E.C.R. 277; Commission v. Greece, Case C-259/94, [1995] E.C.R. 1-1947.
53. Commission v. Belgium, Case 77/69, [1970.1 E.C.R. 237, 243, [1967-1970
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8089.
54. Commission v. Italy, Case C-157/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-57; Commission v. Nether-
lands, Case C-339/87, [1990] E.C.R. 1-851, 1-881, 8.
55. Commission v. Italy, Case 100/77, [1978] E.C.R. 879, [1979] 2 C.M.L.I. 655;
Commission v. Belgium, Case 102/79, [1980] E.C.R. 1473, [1981] 1 C.M.L.R. 282; Com-
mission v. Belgium, Case 69/81, [1982] E.C.R. 163, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8800; Commission v. Italy, Case 279/83, [1984] E.C.R. 3403,
[1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,129; Commission v. Italy,
Case 262/85, [1987] E.C.R. 3073; Commission v. Italy, Case C-33/90, [1991] E.C.R. I-
5987, [1992] 2 C.M.L.R. 353.
56. Council Directive No. 80/778, OJ. L 229/11 (1980).
57. Commission v. Belgium, Case C-42/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2821, 1-2841-42, It 22-
26 [1991-1993 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 95,838.
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This obligation, however, does not absolve the Member States
from their liability towards the Community.5
The obligation arising from a directive to guarantee the re-
sult prescribed and to take all appropriate measures to ensure
that fulfillment of the obligation is also binding upon state
courts. It follows that, when applying national law relating to a
Community directive, the domestic court interpreting that law
must apply such law in light of the wording and the purpose of
the directive so as to achieve the desired result.59
Where a Member State has failed to take measures required
or has adopted measures that do not conform with a directive,
the Court of Justice has recognized the right of individuals af-
fected by such violations to rely on law based on a directive
against a defaulting Member State. The Court ofJustice's recog-
nition of the right of individuals occurs when the relevant provi-
sion is sufficiently precise and when it does not require other
measures to be taken on the part of the Member States and does
not leave discretion to the national legislature.60 A Community
provision is unconditional when it is not subject, in its imple-
mentation or effects, to the taking of any measure either by the
institution of the Community or by Member States.
Moreover, a provision is sufficiently precise and can be re-
lied on by individuals and applied by the Court of Justice where
the obligation is set out in unequivocal terms. This doctrine of
direct effect, a term that does not appear in the EC Treaty, was
first phrased by the Court of Justice twenty-five years ago6 as
follows: " [T] he useful effect of such an act would be weakened if
individuals were prevented from relying on it before their na-
tional courts and if the latter were prevented from taking it into
consideration as an element of Community law."'6 2
Individuals can therefore claim substantive rights derived
from Community directives against Member States without im-
58. Commission v. Germany, Case C-237/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-5973.
59. Marleasing v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion, Case C-106/89,
[1990] E.C.R. 1-4135, 1-4159, 8, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 305, 322; Wagner Miret v. Fondo de
Garantia Salarial, Case C-334/92, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6911, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. 49.
60. Becker v. Finanzamt Muenster-Innenstadt, Case 8/81, [1982] E.C.R. 53, [1982]
1 C.M.L.R. 499.
61. Van Duyn v. Home Office, Case 41/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1337, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R.
1.
62. Id. at 1348, 9 12, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 16.
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plementing legislation every time the deadline for implementa-
tion has not been met and the above-mentioned substantive re-
quirements are fulfilled. The underlying reasoning of the direct
effect of directives has since evolved to a quasi-estoppel argu-
ment63 that has been described by the Court of Justice as follows:
"[a] Member State which has not adopted the implementing
measures required by the Directive in the prescribed periods
may not rely, as against individuals, on its own failure to perform
the obligations which the Directive entails."64
This doctrine has been upheld by the Court of Justice ever
since then.6" One recent example is the meaning given by the
Court of Justice to a little-known directive adopted in 1983. Di-
rective 83/189 is designed to prevent Member States from adopt-
ing technical standards that endanger the free movement of
goods in the Community.6 6 It lays down a procedure for the pro-
vision of information in the field of technical standards and reg-
ulations. Articles 8 and 9 of the directive require that Member
States not enforce new technical provisions until the Commis-
sion has had the opportunity to examine the impact of those
regulations on the common market. Article 8(1) of the directive
provides as follows:
Member States shall immediately communicate to the Com-
mission any draft technical regulation, except where such
technical regulation merely transposes the full text of an in-
ternational or European standard, in which case information
regarding the relevant standard shall suffice; they shall also
let the Commission have a brief statement of the grounds
which make the enactment of such a technical regulation
necessary, where these are not already made clear in the
draft. Where appropriate, Member States shall simultane-
ously communicate the text of the basic legislative or regula-
tory provisions principally and directly concerned, should
knowledge of such text be necessary to assess the implications
63. Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti, Case 148/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1629, [1980] 1
C.M.L.R. 96.
64. Id. at 1642, 22, [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. at 110.
65. Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority,
Case 152/84, [1986] E.C.R. 723, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 688.
66. Council Directive No. 83/189, O.J. L 109/8 (1983), amended by Council Direc-
tive No. 88/182, O.J. L 81/75 (1988).
710 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:696
of the draft technical regulation. 67
In the CIA Security International case, the plaintiff sought an
injunction based on a Belgian unfair trading-practices law of
1991 against two competitors. The plaintiff asserted that the
competitors had libeled it by asserting that its alarm systems did
not comply with the requirements of Belgian law. The competi-
tors counterclaimed for an order restraining the plaintiff from
marketing an unapproved system. The Belgian regulation upon
which this counterclaim was based had not been notified to the
Commission, as required by Article 8 of Directive 83/189.
In its judgment of April 30, 1996,68 the Court of Justice ex-
amined in great detail the legal consequences that might be de-
rived from a Member State's failure to implement this directive.
The Court of Justice held Articles 8 and 9 of the directive to be
effective. It also held that the legal consequences drawn from a
Member State's failure to notify a technical standard or regula-
tion, which the Court of Justice classified as a "substantial proce-
dural defect," were that the non-notified measure was unen-
forceable against individuals. 69 The Court ofJustice emphasized
the trade-facilitating motive underlying Directive 83/189, which
could have been undermined if the defendants had been enti-
tled to rely on the non-notified national regulation, given that
CIA Security's alarm system contained parts manufactured in
two other Member States besides Belgium.
Regarding the legal consequences of a breach by a Member
State of the obligation to notify new technical rules, the Court of
Justice held that individuals may rely on Articles 8 and 9 of the
directive against their national authorities. The Court of Justice
also held that a procedural defect in the adoption of the techni-
cal regulations renders such regulations inapplicable so that they
may not be enforced against individuals.
There are two important limitations on the effects of direc-
tives. First, even in the absence of implementing legislation, a
directive cannot alone have the effect of determining the liabil-
ity in criminal law of persons who act in contravention of the
67. Council Directive No. 83/189, art. 8, O.J. L 109/8, at 11 (1983), amended by
Council Directive No. 88/182, OJ. L 81/75 (1988).
68. CIA Security International SA v. Signalson SA and Securitel SPRL, Case C-194/
94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-2201, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 781.
69. Id. at 1-2246, 48, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 798.
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directive.7 ° Similar principles apply where a Member State has
introduced legislation to give effect to a directive but that legisla-
tion, although creating criminal liability, does not clearly specify
all the circumstances in which that liability arises. National
courts are not required, as a matter of Community law, to inter-
pret domestic legislation in light of the wording and purpose of
directives where the result would be to impose criminal liability
that would not otherwise arise. Second, the Court of Justice has
consistently held that even in a situation of non-implementation,
a directive may not alone impose obligations on an individual
and may therefore not be relied upon by another individual.7 1
III. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION AN) COMMUNITY LAW
In 1984, the Court of Justice held that "all the authorities of
the Member States, including the judicial authorities, are
obliged to take all measures necessary to achieve the result envis-
aged by directive and in particular to interpret their national law
in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive."7 2
This requirement includes the obligation to afford effective
sanctions for breaches of EC laws. 7' As outlined above, this Arti-
cle is focused on the words "all the authorities of the Member
States." Indeed, the Court of Justice has always stressed that all
public entities are under a duty to act in accordance with Com-
munity law and to protect individual rights created by that legal
order. It is submitted, however, that legal scholarship so far has
concentrated mainly on the phrase "including the judicial au-
thorities," and examined the scope of the obligations for state
courts to ensure compliance with Community law.74
70. Pretore di Salo v. Persons Unknown, Case 14/86, [1987] E.C.R. 2545, [1989] 1
C.M.L.R. 71; Officier Van Justitie v. Kolpinghuis Nijmegen, Case 80/86, [1987] E.C.R.
3969, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 18.
71. Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl, Case C-91/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-3325, 1-3355, 20,
[1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 665, 689; El Corte Ingles v. Blazquez Rivero, Case C-192/94, [1996]
E.C.R. 1-1281, 1-1303, 15, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 507, 521. For a general discussion, see
SAcHA PRECHAL, DIRECTivEs IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, A STUDY OF DIRECTIVES AND
THEIR ENFORCEMENT IN NATIONAL COURTS (1995).
72. Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83, [1984]
E.C.R. 1891, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430; Harz v. Deutsche Tradax, Case 79/83, [1984]
E.C.R. 1921, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430.
73. Haz, at 1939, 15, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. at 451.
74. Plaza Martin, Furthering the Effectiveness of EC Directives and the Judicial Protection
of Rights Thereunder, 43 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 26 (1994); GIL CARLOS RODRIGUEZ IGLESIAS &
KURT RIECHENBERG, ZUR RICHTLINIENKONFORMEN AUSLEGUNG DES NATIONALEN RECHTS,
712 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:696
The Court of Justice has given a broad meaning to the no-
tion of public authorities that are bound by the direct effect of
directives, emphasizing that their binding nature extends to all
public authorities, including private entities or organizations
that are controlled by the state75 or that have special powers
based on public law.7 6
Administrative compliance with Community law may be
even more important than judicial enforcement because judicial
review of administrative action or inaction may come too late
and may not provide for comprehensive compliance.77 It is sub-
mitted that the discussion in recent years regarding the binding
force of Community law within the domestic legal order of Mem-
ber States has focused too exclusively on the obligations of na-
tional courts to give full effect to Community law in judicial dis-
pute resolution. A recent example is the legal debate surround-
ing the impact of Community law on national rules of judicial
procedure.78
In many cases, the cost of judicial review might be so pro-
hibitive that administrative behavior is not easily challenged. Ad-
ministrative action very often produces results that are not always
eliminated by judicial relief. Community infringement proceed-
ings under Article 169 of the EC Treaty are too complex to have
an immediate impact upon administrative authorities in the
Member States. There is general recognition that the infringe-
ment procedure under Article 169 of the EC Treaty is not a' par-
ticularly efficient instrument to control the respect of Commu-
nity law by Member States. Last year, the Council adopted a reg-
ulation designed to accelerate this procedure in cases of serious
FESTSCHRIFr FOR ULRICH EVERLING, NoMos VERLAGSGESELLSCHAFr BADEN-BADEN Vol. II,
1213 (1995) (with further references).
75. Foster v. British Gas, Case C-188/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3313, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R.
833.
76. Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Case 222/84,
[1986] E.C.R. 1651, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R. 833.
77. Grainne De Birca, Giving Effect to European Community Directives, 55 MOD. L.
Rtv. 215 (1992).
78. Emmott v. Minister for Social Welfare and the Attorney General, Case C-208/
90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-4269, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 894 (Community law and national proce-
dural time limits); Oleificio Borelli v. Commission, Case C-97/91, [1992] E.C.R. 1-6313
(Community law and national procedural rules regarding standing in administrative
disputes); Gil Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias, Zu den Grenzen der verfahrensrechtlichen Autonomie
der Mitgliedstaaten bei der Anwendung des Gemeinschaftsrechts, 24 EUROPAISCHE GRUN-
DRECHTEZEITSCHRIFT 289 (1997).
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violations of Community law that threaten the common mar-
ket.79
The efficient application of Community law can therefore
not be entrusted exclusively to the courts where litigants may
face various procedural rules that may make judicial enforce-
ment difficult.8" Compliance with Community law on the local
or regional level is also important because lower administrative
bodies may face financial liabilities for violations of Community
rights on the basis of the case law of the Court of Justice.
It is argued that the case law surrounding the legal effects of
Community directives on national administrative action is suffi-
ciently broad and well-established to give precise guidelines to
national administrative bodies as to legal directives that are to be
applied in individual cases. Those guidelines are important re-
gardless of whether the national legislature has implemented the
relevant directive.
The relevant Court of Justice rulings do not contain general
instructions relating to the characteristics of national administra-
tive action. This Article, however, concludes that national ad-
ministrative authorities are under a duty to apply Community
directives according to the specific stipulations contained in
those instruments. Such a clarification is necessary because
Member States have argued that, despite the fact that a directive
has not been transformed into domestic law within the pre-
scribed time limit, national administrative authorities are only
bound to apply those provisions of a directive that are intended
to create individual rights and that are sufficiently precise and
unconditional for that purpose.
If Community law is to be implemented not only through
domestic legislation but also through decentralized administra-
tive action, the duty of regional or local administrative bodies to
apply Community law is an essential condition for the full effect
of that legal order.81 In the environmental field, for example,
correct implementation of the relevant Community directives
would be impossible without administrative action in accordance
with those directives, regardless of whether domestic legislation
79. Council Regulation No. 2679/98, 26 bis, 0j. L 337/8 (1998).
80. Richard Macrory, The Enforcement of Community Environmental Laws, 29 COMMON
MKT. L. REv. 347 (1992).
81. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Committee on the Regions and the Role of Regional Govern-
ments in the European Union, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & ComP. L. REv. 413 (1997).
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has been enacted or whether that legislation alone is sufficient
to implement Community law.
The nature of many Community directives that regulate ad-
ministrative behavior implies a direct mandate for the domestic
administration. Denying the binding force of Community direc-
tives in such situations would amount to admitting serious de-
fects in the implementation of Community law. Such a situation
would therefore run counter to the very foundations of the Com-
munity legal order.8 2
Direct effect of Community directives cannot depend on
whether they create individual rights. 83 For example, many envi-
ronmental directives contain very precise orders for action or
control that can be regulated only in a general framework by
domestic legislation. In practice, these requirements can be ful-
filled only by protective action of the national administration. In
other words, to the extent that a given subject matter is incapa-
ble of being implemented through legislation only, it is the na-
tional administration to which the mandate to give full effect to
Community law applies.
In most cases, such a mandate fits into the distribution of
powers within the Member States. Direct effect as a mandate for
administrative action is therefore to be distinguished from the
question of whether that very same direct effect also implies the
existence of individual rights. The following analysis attempts to
offer a definition of administrative obligations designed to guar-
antee the direct effect of Community law.
IV. THE CASE LAW OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE
REGARDING THE DIRECT EFFECT OF
COMMUNITY DIRECTIVES IN THE AREA
OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
The case law discussed in the following part concerns a wide
variety of legal situations. The common feature, however, is the
question of how the Court of Justice has reached its conclusions
that EC directives may mandate state authorities to apply specific
provisions of EC directives. The following review of the Court of
82. Gertrud Lfibbe-Wolf, Volzugsprobleme der Umweltverwaltung, 15 NATUR UND
RECHT 217 (1993).
83. Peter Pagh, The "Direct Effect Doctrine" in EC Environmental Law, 64 NoRIeic J.
INT'L L. 23 (1995).
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Justice's case law features the most relevant cases regarding ad-
ministrative obligations based upon Community law.
A. Environmental Protection
Environmental litigation in the European Court of Justice is
a recent phenomenon compared with other types of litigation.
Environmental cases brought before the Court of Justice and dis-
cussed in this Article can be divided into two categories, namely
litigation between the European Commission and the EC Mem-
ber States under Article 169 of the EC Treaty and references for
preliminary rulings from national courts pursuant to Article 177
of the EC Treaty.
In the environmental field, only a small part of Community
law is implemented directly by Community institutions.84 By vir-
tue of the decentralized structure of the Community, which is
even less amenable to unitary administration than federal bod-
ies, protective measures are, for the most part, implemented by
the authorities of the Member States. If a national court is called
upon to rule on the legality of such national implementing
measures, then it must take into consideration Community law
that forms the legal basis for such measures and determines the
results to be achieved.
Environmental litigation plays an ever increasing role be-
cause implementation and enforcement of Community direc-
tives lags behind the legislative output. European institutions
have more impact on policy formulation and legislation than on
implementation. The areas under the Community's jurisdiction
include the whole field of environmental protection, encompass-
ing even measures not directly linked to intra-Community trade
and not necessarily involving transborder pollution.85 Environ-
mental protection has become one of the most dynamic areas of
legislative activity at the Community level. The European envi-
ronmental policy area is characterized by complex interactions
between the Community and its Member States that diverge con-
84. Koen Lenaerts, The Principle of Subsidiay and the Environment in the European
Union: Keeping the Balance of Federalism, 17 FoRDiaM INT'L L.J. 846 (1994).
85. Ian Bird & Miguel Veiga-Pestana, European Community Environmental Policy and
Law, in EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW Af-rER 1992, at 219-51 (1993); RolfWfgenbaur, Reg-
ulating the European Environment: The EC Experience, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 17 (1992).
716 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:696
siderably from one another in their state of environmental
awareness and capacity for environmental protection.
Although some states may have stronger standards of envi-
ronmental protection than those prescribed by Community di-
rectives, the overall tendency has been one of significantly up-
grading most of the Member States' protection of the environ-
ment. While it is conceivable that the concept of subsidiarity
might be applied in the future to this area, diluting or weaken-
ing the Community's jurisdiction, European institutions are still
at the center of EC environmental policy.86 Not many areas have
been left entirely untouched, even if the depth of Community
involvement remains uneven. By the mid-1980s, virtually all as-
pects of environmental policy had been addressed, in one form
or another, at the Community level. Air and water pollution as
well as waste management have received considerable legislative
attention, and the Community has also legislated in the areas of
chemicals, hazardous substances, nuclear safety, wildlife, and
noise.87
The problem of inadequate implementation of Community
legislation has various aspects.88 First, the actions brought by the
Commission show that a significant number of Community di-
rectives on the environment are transposed incompletely or be-
latedly into national legislation. The number of those infringe-
ments has been constantly increasing since 1979. For example,
it amounted to more than 500 between all Member States in
1990.89
Second, rules of Community or national environmental law
are not always monitored and enforced by administrative author-
ities due to a lack of personnel and technical equipment. Envi-
86. LUDWIG KRAMER, EC TREATY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAw (3d ed. 1998).
87. Philipp Hildebrand, The European Community's Environmental Policy 1957 to
1992: From Incidental Measures to an International Regime, in A GREEN DIMENSION FOR THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY- POLITICAL ISSUES AND PROCESSES (1993).
88. Ken Collins & D. Earnshow, The Implementation and Enforcement of European Com-
munity Environment Legislation, in A GREEN DIMENSION FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.
POLITICAL ISSUES AND PROCESSES 213 (1993); Hazel Fox et al., The Reception of European
Community Law into Domestic Law, in THE INTEGRATION OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW INTO THE NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, THE HAGUE 27 (1996); FIONA GAS-
KIN, The Implementation of Environmental Law, 2 REv. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L.
335 (1993).
89. Ludwig Krhmer, The Implementation of Environmental Laws by the European Com-
munities, 34 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 9, 31 (1991).
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ronmental management, moreover, is sometimes characterized
by a lack of transparency of responsibilities as well as by the fact
that national officials do not always have a sufficient knowledge
of EC environmental law and of the Court of Justice's case law.90
The large number of environmental directives means that
many different procedures are laid down in those acts that often
concern different authorities at the same time. Additional
problems arise if directives stipulate procedures that require
completely new organizational structures and processes in the
Member States. On the other hand, there may be problems in
Member States that already apply a similar but not identical pro-
cedure. In such a case, authorities have already developed pro-
cedures and are perhaps not convinced of the need to make
changes that they may perceive as unnecessary. Environmental
legislation comprises a wide range of administrative obligations,
such as obligations to formulate plans, to identify areas under
threats, to grant permissions, to provide information, to carry
out assessments and evaluations, and to enact prohibitions relat-
ing to the handling of hazardous substances, as well as general
supervisory obligations.9
Where Community environmental directives have not been
complied with, various legal options exist, at least in theory, to
ensure enforcement.92 If national authorities either fail to apply
environmental rules to the measures that they adopt or fail to
enforce the environmental laws regarding the private sector,
then citizens may challenge those authorities in national courts.
When a Member State is alleged to have violated environmental
directives, citizens may complain to the European Commission
and call upon that body to bring enforcement proceedings
against the Member State under Article 169 of the EC Treaty.
This option relates to various kinds of infringements, including
incomplete or incorrect implementation or inadequate enforce-
ment by the national authorities. The Court of Justice then is
empowered to establish formally an infringement of Community
90. Rolf W. Wagenbaur, The European Community's Policy on Implementation of Envi-
ronmental Directives, 14 FoRDHAM INT'L L. J. 455 (1990); Wouter Wils, Subsidiary and EC
Environmental Policy: Taking People's Concerns Seriously, 6 J. ENVrL. L. 85 (1994).
91. J.W. Van den Gronden, The Enforcement of EC Environmental Law by Decentralized
Authorities, in UWrR, DER EINFLUB DES EG-UMWELTRECHTS AUF DAS UMWELTRECHT DER
MITGLIEDSTAATEN 25 (1996).
92. LUDWIG KRAMER, Focus ON EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2d ed. 1997).
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law, but the affected Member State alone decides what conclu-
sions to draw from the judgment and how to comply with it.
Due to the formalized nature of the procedure, it regularly
takes at least two years from the commencement of the Article
169 proceedings to the Court of Justice ruling. The Commission
may also initiate "urgency procedures" under Article 185 of the
EC Treaty to speed up the whole process, but due to a lack of
staff and documentary resources, this is rarely done.
There has been a substantial amount of litigation between
the Commission and Member States regarding issues of notifica-
tion, correct legislative implementation, and practical enforce-
ment of the many environmental directives.93 It is questionable
whether a central authority such as the Commission will ever be
able to police effectively the implementation of environmental
law over such a large territory as the Community. Moreover, the
principle of subsidiarity, as laid down in Article 3b of the EC
Treaty, speaks against any large-scale extension of administrative
powers on the Community level. The preferable solution to the
problem, therefore, is to promote a decentralized control of the
implementation of environmental law by improving the access to
national courts and to administrative procedures for citizens and
organizations who act in the interest of environmental protec-
tion.
As already mentioned, the Court of Justice has held that
Community law may confer substantive rights in certain areas of
environmental protection. In its judgments of February 28,
1991, 94 and May 30, 1991, 95 the Court ofJustice emphasized that
the obligation imposed on Member States to prescribe certain
limit values in the interest of human health, as contained in the
water and air pollution directives, creates rights for all affected
individuals. Accordingly, they must be able to assert their rights
and to invoke those binding provisions of Community law in na-
tional courts.
Precise legislative and administrative obligations can be cre-
ated from the objective to protect human health. If there is a
93. European Commission, 13th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of
Community Law 1995, COM (96) 600 Final (May 29, 1996).
94. Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case C-131/88, [1991] E.C.R. I-
825.
95. Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case C-361/88, [1991] E.C.R. I-
2567, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 821.
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lack of implementing legislation or insufficient administrative
action, then Member States could be liable for the harm suffered
by individuals. The question of whether an EC environmental
directive is capable of creating individual rights was brought
before the Court of Justice for the first time in 1987.
The problems referred to the Court ofJustice were raised in
proceedings brought by several producers of plastic containers,
wrappings, and bags against an Italian municipality. The pro-
ceedings concerned the decision of the mayor to prohibit the
supply of non-biodegradable bags and other containers in which
customers carry away their purchases. The sale and distribution
of plastic bags, with the exception of those intended for the col-
lection of waste, was also prohibited.96
The plaintiffs claimed that the prohibition was contrary to
Community law. The Italian court therefore asked the Court of
Justice whether Directive 75/442 on waste9 7 gives citizens a right
under Community law to sell or to use the products named in
the directives. The Italian court observed that the three direc-
tives regulated the disposal of the products governed by them,
but did not prohibit their sale or use. The Italian court also
asked the Court of Justice whether it followed from the directive
that any draft regulation or legislative measure regarding the
sale or use of the products in question that may give rise to tech-
nical difficulties in their disposal or to excessive costs of disposal
must be brought to the attention of the Commission before its
adoption."
Regarding the question whether Directive 75/442 gives indi-
viduals the right to sell or use to plastic bags and other non-
biodegradable containers, the Court of Justice stressed the pur-
pose of the directive, which it held was the harmonization of na-
tional laws regarding the disposal of waste with a view to elimi-
nate barriers to intra-Community trade. The Court of Justice
also held that the directive did not prohibit the sale or use of any
product. Accordingly, it cannot be inferred that the directive
prevents Member States from imposing such prohibitions in or-
der to protect the environment. Directive 75/442 does not,
96. Enichem Base v. Cinisello Balsamo, Case C-380/87, [1989] E.C.R. 2491, [1991]
1 C.M.L.R. 313.
97. Council Directive No. 75/442, O.J. L 194/34 (1975), amended by Council Direc-
tive No. 91/155, O.J. L 78/32 (1991).
98. Cinisello Balsamo, [1989] E.C.R. at 1-2514, 1 3, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 323.
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therefore, create an individual right to sell or to use plastic
bags.99
The Court of Justice added that Article 3(2) of Directive
75/442, properly construed, does not give individuals any right
that they may enforce before national courts in order to obtain
the annulment or suspension of national rules falling within the
scope of that provision on the ground that the rules were
adopted without having been previously communicated to the
Commission.1 00
It follows that not all EC directives in the field of environ-
mental protection are designed to create individual rights. This
does not mean, however, that they do not produce legal effects.
On the contrary, if they fulfill the requirements of clarity, preci-
sion, and unconditionality described above, then they generate
obligations regarding the national legislature and administra-
tion.
1. Protection of Birds
Directive 79/409/EEC1 0 1 of April 2, 1979, on the conserva-
tion of wild birds provides the best example for a legislative in-
strument that requires implementation measures not only at the
national but also at the regional and local level. None of the
Member States incorporated Directive 79/409 into national law
by a single legislative instrument or set of rules.10 2 Rule-making
powers in the sphere of nature conservation are often delegated
to the regions, as is the case in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and
Spain. Even in a country like France, the rules governing hunt-
ing are laid down partly at the departmental level. Administra-
tive obligations to act on the basis of various protective provi-
sions of that directive have to be distinguished from the question
of whether additional legislative implementation is required.
Compared to other environmental directives, there is a signifi-
99. Id. at 1-2515-16, 6-11, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 324-25.
100. Id. at 1-2517-18, 1 19-24, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 325-26; Comitato di Coordina-
mento per la Difesa della Cava and Others v. Regione Lombardia and Others, Case C-
236/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-483.
101. Council Directive No. 79/409/EEC, OJ. L 103/1 (1979).
102. David Freestone, European Community Environmental Policy and Law, 18 J. L. &
Soc'v 135 (1991); David Freestone, The Enforcement of the Wild Birds Directive: A Case
Study, in PROTECTING THE EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT: ENFORCING EC ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw 229 (1996).
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cant number of judgments of the Court of Justice, beginning in
1987, that have clarified the scope of administrative obligations
based upon Directive 79/409.103
Two aspects of bird protection are discussed here. First, Ar-
ticle 4 of Directive 79/409 requires Member States to designate
special protection areas for birds that are in danger of extinction
and to take measures to protect those areas. Second, Articles 7
and 9 of the directive provide for a comprehensive regulation of
bird hunting.
a. Special Protection Areas
Article 4 of Directive 79/409 is the first Community direc-
tive creating comprehensive rules for the selection and manage-
ment of nature habitats.10 4 Under the directive, Member States
are required to designate special protection areas for migratory
birds or other species threatened with extinction. Reflecting the
seriousness of the subject matter, the selection of designated ar-
eas must be made on the national or regional level through leg-
islation establishing a special legal status for such areas. Also,
Member States must provide a framework of instruments for the
management of these areas.
Section 4 of Article 4 requires Member States to take spe-
cific protection measures, including appropriate steps to avoid
pollution or deterioration of habitats or any disturbances affect-
ing the birds. Three judgments of the Court of Justice have es-
tablished precise obligations of national administrative authori-
ties to comply with the mandate of protection established by Sec-
tion 4.
The first case brought before the Court of Justice was pre-
ceded by a Commission request to stop the construction of a
dike in Northern Germany. This application was rejected.105 In
103. Kurt Riechenberg, La Directiva Sobre la Proteccitn de las Aves Salvajes: Un Hito en
la Politica Comunitaria del Medio Ambiente, 17 REVISTA DE INSTITUCIONES EUROPEAS 369
(1990).
104. David Baldock, The Status of Special Protection Areas for the Protection of Wild Birds,
4J. ENVTL. L. 139 (1992); JAN F. SPELLERBERG, EVALUATION AND ASSESSMENT FOR CONSER-
VATION: ECOLOGICAL GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING PRIORITIES FOR NATURE CONSERVA-
TION (1994).
105. Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case 57/89, [1989) E.C.R.
2849, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 651.
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its main judgment,"°6 the Court of Justice held that Member
State authorities may not reduce the surface of special protec-
tion areas, except for exceptional reasons of public interest. 0
7
In the Leybucht case, the Court of Justice recognized that both
the danger of flooding and the protection of the coast consti-
tuted sufficiently serious reasons to justify the dike works, and
that the strengthening of coastal structures as long as those
measures were confined to a strict minimum involved only the
smallest possible reduction of the special protection area.1 0
8
The Court ofJustice's judgment provides an interesting example
of the impact of a Community directive upon planning decisions
by local authorities.
In 1993, the Court of Justice dealt with another action
brought by the Commission, in which several local infrastructure
measures in Spain were criticized for being in violation of Article
4 of the directive. In its judgment, the Court of Justice held:
although Member States do have a certain margin of discre-
tion with regard to the choice of special protection areas, the
classification of those areas is nevertheless subject to certain
ornithological criteria determined by the Directive, such as
the presence of birds listed in annex I, on the one hand, and
the classification of a habitat as a wetland area, on the
other.109
In this case, the Commission alleged that the Kingdom of
Spain had failed to fulfill its obligations under Articles 3 and 4 of
Directive 79/409.10 The Commission suggested that Spain had
failed to take certain measures to protect the environment in
accordance with the ecological needs of certain habitats. It also
alleged that sufficient measures were not taken to re-establish
biotopes that had been destroyed in the Santofia marshes in the
Autonomous Community of Cantabria. Morever, the Commis-
sion accused Spain of not classifying certain marshes as special
protection areas and not taking appropriate steps to avoid pollu-
tion and deterioration of habitats in that area.
The Commission identified a series of local measures en-
106. Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case C-57/89, [1991] E.C.R. I-
883.
107. Id. at 1-930-31, 20.
108. Id. at 1-931, 1 23.
109. Commission v. Spain, Case C-355/90, [1993] E.C.R. 1-4221.
110. Id. at 1-4273, 1.
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dangering bird life in the Santofia marshes, such as the construc-
tion of a road through a part of the marshes, the establishment
of industrial estates, the granting of administrative authorization
to a fishermen's association to farm clams in the middle of the
marshes, and the discharge of untreated waste water.111 The
Court of Justice held that Spain's actions were incompatible with
the requirements of Article 4(4) of the Directive.1 12 Although
the judgment is against the Kingdom of Spain, it is clear whether
the Court of Justice considered local administrative action and
inaction to be in violation of Community law."1
These rulings were confirmed by the Court of Justice in first
judgment based upon a reference for a preliminary ruling in the
field of special protection areas' 1 4 In 1993, the British Secretary
of State had decided to designate the Medway Estuary and Mar-
shes as a special protection area for birds. At the same time, an
area of about twenty-two hectares, known as Lappel Bank, had
been excluded from this area. Lappel Bank is an area of inter-
tidal mudflat immediately adjoining the Port of Sheerness, situ-
ated within the boundaries of the Medway Estuary and Marshes.
It shares several of the important ornithological qualities of the
area as a whole, and it is an important component of the overall
estuarine ecosystem. The designated Medway Estuary is a wet-
land of international importance also listed under the Ramsar
Wetlands Convention for a range of wildfowl and wader species
who use it as a wintering area and as a staging post during spring
and autumn migration. Further, the site supports breeding
populations of avocet and little tern, with area species listed in
Annex I for the purpose of Article 4(1) of the bird directive. 1 '
The Port of Sheerness planned extended facilities for car
storage and value-added activities on vehicles and in the fruit
and paper product market in order to compete better with conti-
nental ports offering similar facilities, and Lappel Bank was the
only area into which the Port of Sheerness could envisage ex-
111. Id. at 1-4274, 6.
112. Id. at 1-4281-84, 37, 41, 46, 53.
113. For another Spanish example, see James J. Friedberg, Views of Dofiana: Frag-
mentation and Environmental Policy in Spain, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. I (Fall/Winter 1996/
1997).
114. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Royal Society for the
Protection of Birds, Case C-44/95, [1996] E.C.R. 1-3843.
115. Id. at 1-3848-49, 99 11, 12.
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panding. Accordingly, taking the view that both the need not to
inhibit the viability of the port and the significant contribution
that expansion into the area of Lappel Bank would make to the
local and national economy outweighed its nature conservation
value, the Secretary of State decided to exclude that area from
the Medway special protection area.1 16
The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds brought an
action against that decision, arguing that it was illegal by virtue
of the Wild Birds Directive to consider economic considerations
when classifying a special protection area. The House of Lords
stayed proceedings and asked the Court of Justice whether the
Wild Birds Directive allowed a Member State to take account of
economic requirements when designating such an area and de-
fining its boundaries. The Court of Justice observed that the di-
rective prescribed the creation of a special protection area and a
regime that targeted both the most endangered species and mi-
gratory species'. The Court ofJustice concluded that the ecologi-
cal requirements laid down by the directive did not have to be
balanced against the economic requirements. 117
The House of Lords also considered whether the Wild Birds
Directive allows a Member State, when designating a special pro-
tection area, to take account of economic requirements as con-
stituting a general interest superior to that represented by the
ecological objective of that directive. The Court of Justice re-
plied that, regarding its 1993 judgment in the Santofa Marshes
case, economic requirements could not correspond to a general
interest superior to that represented by the ecological objective
of the Directive. It follows from those three rulings that it is obli-
gatory under Section 4 of Article 4 that special protection areas
should be protected and that permission should not be granted
for activities that threaten these areas. 18
Regarding the designation of special protection areas, the
Court of Justice in 1998 held the Netherlands to be in violation
of Directive 79/409 for not having designated a sufficient
number of special protection areas." 9 This holding was the first
time that a Member State had been condemned for its wild bird
116. Id. at 1-3849, 13, 14.
117. Id. at 1-3850-52, 17-27.
118. Id. at 1-3853, 28-31.
119. Commission v. Netherlands, Case C-3/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-3031.
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conservation policy as a whole. The Court of Justice held that
"while the Member States have a certain margin of discretion in
the choice of those areas, their classification is nevertheless sub-
ject to certain ornithological criteria determined by the Direc-
tive. 1120 In addition, Member States are required to designate
special protection areas, an obligation that it is not possible to
avoid by adopting other special conservation methods.
The Court of Justice was of the opinion that the designation
by the Netherlands of only twenty-three areas of a total surface
area of 327,602 hectares was insufficient in comparison with the
figures published in the Inventory of Important Bird Areas in
the European Community (IBA 89).121 According to the report,
there were to be seventy Dutch special protection areas covering
797,920 hectares. The Court of Justice emphasized that the IBA
ornithological study is the "only document containing scientific
evidence making it possible to assess whether the defendant
State has fulfilled its obligation to classify as special protection
areas the most suitable territories."122 Germany supported the
Netherlands in this case, arguing that the IBA list was non-bind-
ing and discretionary.1 2 1
At present, several cases are pending before the Court of
Justice that raise questions regarding the obligations of local au-
thorities to protect habitats of wild fauna and flora. The most
interesting cases are infringement proceedings brought by the
Commission against France. 124 Another case is a reference for a
preliminary ruling from the English High Court, Queen's Bench
Division, asking the Court of Justice whether
a Member State is entitled or obliged to take account of the
consideration laid down in Article 2(3) of Council Directive
92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of
wild fauna and flora, namely, economic, social, and cultural
requirements and regional and local characteristics, when de-
120. Id. at 1-3070, 60.
121. Id. at 1-3073, 72.
122. Id. at 1-3072, 1 69.
123. Id. at 1-3068, 1 53.
124. Commission v. France, Case C-166/97, 0.J. C 212/13 (1997) (pending case)
(conservation measures in Seine estuary); Commission v. France, Case C-96/98, O.J. C
166/14 (1998) (pending case) (protective regime for Marais Poitevin); Commission v.
France, Case C-374/98, 0J. C 378/11 (1998) (pending case) (deterioration of Basses
Corbi~res); Commission v. Netherlands, Case C-63/98, O.J. C 166/2 (1998) (pending
case) (fisheries management in Waddenzee).
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ciding which sites to propose to the Commission pursuant to
Article 4(1) of that Directive and/or in defining the bounda-
ries of such sites. 125
b. Bird Hunting
Articles 7 and 9 of Directive 79/409 provide for strict con-
trol over bird hunting. While Article 7 establishes the general
rules of protection, especially with regard to nesting and migra-
tory birds, Article 9 regulates the conditions under which bird
hunting is permitted. The Court of Justice has taken a very strict
position on the obligations of national administrative authorities
to ensure the full effect of those protective provisions. Hunting
regulation is a good example of the decentralized implementa-
tion of Community law due to the very nature of the subject mat-
ter. National legislation can only offer a general framework but
is certainly unable to say when and where a certain species of
birds can be hunted.
In some Member States, such as France, the rules for hunt-
ing, which were introduced long before the adoption of Direc-
tive 79/409, fail to coincide with the directive, due partly to the
lobbying of pressure groups. 126 Since 1987, the provisions of the
directive relating to hunting restrictions have been interpreted
by the Court of Justice in the context of numerous infringement
proceedings initiated by the Commission against Member
States. 127
In two judgments of general importance to all Member
States,128 the Court of Justice held that Article 2 of Directive 79/
409 is not an autonomous detraction from the general system of
protection of wild birds. Specific provisions of the directive,
such as Article 7(4), suggest that the effective protection of birds
is necessary, as well as the "requirements of public health and
safety, the economy, ecology, science, farming, and recrea-
125. Queen v. Secretary of State for the Environment, exparteFirst Corporate Ship-
ping Ltd., Case C-371/98, 0.J. C 397/19 (1998) (pending case); Simon Ball, Has the UK
Government Implemented the Habitats Directive Properly?, in THE IMPACT OF EC ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 215 (1997).
126. Francette Fines, Le Contentieux de la Chasse Devant lesJuridictions Administratives
en Aquitaine in Le Droit Communautaire, in LES JUGES ET L'AQUITAINE 139 (1994).
127. Wouter Wils, The Birds Directive 15 Years Later: A Survey of the Case Law and a
Comparison with the Habitats Directive, 6J. ENVrL. L. 219 (1994).
128. Commission v. Belgium, Case 247/85, [1987] E.C.R. 3029, [1989] 1 C.E.C.
(CCH) 175; Commission v. Italy, Case 262/85, [1987] E.C.R. 3073.
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tion."129
The Court of Justice's judgment of January 17, 1991,15' is
the most important ruling regarding the protection of migratory
birds. The Court of Justice first noted that birds' migratory
movements are subject to a degree of variability that depends in
part on meteorological circumstances. Thus, birds from a spe-
cific migratory species may begin their return journey to their
rearing grounds earlier compared to average migratory flows.
This is particularly true where the species concerned regularly
travels between migration and rearing grounds that are a consid-
erable distance apart, causing the birds to cross numerous bor-
ders. Within one species, there are different populations whose
routes sometimes diverge and pass through separate areas."'
The Court of Justice concluded that Article 7(4) of Direc-
tive 79/409 is designed to secure a complete system of protec-
tion while the survival of wild birds is threatened. Accordingly,
protection against hunting activities could not be confined to
the majority of the birds of a given species, as determined by
average migratory movements. 1 32 The Court of Justice also
stressed that regional authorities are unconditionally bound by
those protective provisions.1 33
On the basis of those judgments, the Court of Justice has
clearly defined the scope of administrative obligations in this
field. Its ruling of January 19, 1994, was the first case dealing
with a preliminary reference regarding bird hunting. 13 4 In 1992,
questions concerning the interpretation of Article 7(4) of Direc-
tive 79/409 were raised before the administrative tribunal in
Nantes annulment actions. These actions were introduced by
various associations for the protection of the environment as
well as by hunters' associations against the decisions of the
Prefets of Maine-et-Loire and Loire-Atlantique mandating the
closing dates of their respective departments for the 1992-1993
hunting season. Those proceedings essentially concerned the
129. Belgium, at 3060, 8, [1989] 1 C.E.C. (CCH) at 192; Italy, at 3097, 8.
130. Commission v. Italy, Case C-157/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-57.
131. Id. at 1-86-87, 9 12-13.
132. Id. at 1-87, 14.
133. Id. at 1-88, 17.
134. Association pour la Protection des Animaux Sauvages and Others v. Prefet de
Maine-et-Loire and Prefet de la Loire-Atlantique, Case C-435/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-67,
[1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 685.
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provisions of the directive relating to the protection of migratory
birds during their return to their rearing grounds.
The French administrative tribunal asked the Court of Jus-
tice whether the hunting season of migratory birds and water-
fowl should be closed when pre-mating migration begins or
when migration begins. The French administration also asked
whether staggering the closing dates for hunting seasons by spe-
cies was compatible with the system of protection provided in
the Directive." 5
Under Article 7(4) of Directive 79/409, wild birds are not
hunted during rearing season or during the various reproduc-
tive stages. The Court of Justice suggested that pursuant to Arti-
cle 7(4), the closing date for the hunting of migratory birds and
waterfowl must be fixed in accordance with a method that guar-
antees complete protection of those species during the period of
pre-mating migration. It follows that protective measures that
do not protect a certain percentage of a species do not fulfill the
obligations of the provision.1" 6 This implies a direct mandate of
action for the Prefets.
The Court of Justice also noted that any hunting activity
threatens to affect the state of conservation of the species con-
cerned, independently of the extent to which it depletes num-
bers. The regular elimination of animals keeps the hunted
populations in a permanent state of alert, which has disastrous
consequences for the species.137 The Court ofJustice referred to
the risk that certain species face when their hunting season has
already finished. Such species will be subject to indirect deple-
tion owing to the confusion faced by other species who are still
being hunted. The third sentence of Article 7(4) is intended to
prevent those species from being exposed to depletion because
they are hunted during pre-mating migration.
Article 7(4) requires Member States to take all necessary
measures to prevent any hunting during that period.13 The
Court of Justice concluded that closing the hunting season for
all species when the earliest species migrates guarantees in prin-
ciple that the objective laid down in the third sentence of Article
135. Id. at 1-90-91, 4, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 705.
136. Id. at 1-93, 13, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 706-07.
137. Id. at 1-93, 16, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 707.
138. Id. at 1-94, 18, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 707.
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7(4) is realized.'" 9
The Court of Justice, however, recognized that some evi-
dence suggests that staggering the closing dates for various hunt-
ing seasons does not impede the complete protection of the spe-
cies of bird liable to be affected by such staggering. National
authorities are therefore not empowered by the directive to fix
closing dates for the hunting season that vary according to the
species of bird, unless the Member State brings such scientific
evidence forward.14 As a result, it is clear that if the power to fix
the closing date for the hunting of migratory birds is delegated
to subordinate authorities, those bodies must ensure that the
closing date can be fixed only in such a way as to make possible
complete protection of the birds during pre-mating migration.
Article 7(4) thus imposes specific protective obligation on all ad-
ministrative entities empowered to regulate bird hunting.
In 1996, the Court of Justice had to rule again on a regional
Italian hunting law.' In the national proceedings, the appli-
cants claimed that in the contested measure the Veneto Region
had fixed the regional hunting calendar for the 1992-1993 sea-
son in violation of Articles 7 and 9 of Directive 79/409 because
hunting had been allowed during nesting and migration periods
of several protected species. The applicants argued that the ad-
ministrative decision had to be in full compliance with the dero-
gation criteria laid down in Article 9 of the directive. 142 That
provision allows Member States to derogate from the restrictions
and prohibitions contained in Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the direc-
tive for specific reasons that are expressly and exhaustively listed,
provided that the derogation contains specific details defining
its scope.
In its judgment of March 7, 1996, the Court of Justice held
that the derogation provided for by Article 9, which forms an
exception to prohibitions, and is exhaustive as to reasons and
scope, is the same kind of provision as the prohibition itself, and
must, therefore, be regarded as directly effective, without any
139. Id. at 1-95, 21, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 708.
140. Id. at 1-95, 22, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 708.
141. Associazione Italiana per il World Wildlife Fund v. Regione Veneto, Case C-
118/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1242; Maria Clara Maffei, The Hunting of the Bird Species Bram-
bling and Chaffinch in Italy: A Story of Inconsistencies, 5 EUR. ENVrL. L. REV. 145 (1995).
142. Associazione Italiana, at 1-1246, 9.
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specific implementing measure. 43 It therefore binds adminis-
trative authorities in charge of regulating bird hunting. In other
words, if the regional law is found not to comply with EC law, the
former will not be applied and the legal basis for the permit to
hunt birds will hence have disappeared. As a result of this, the
permit will be quashed, meaning that the competent authorities
will be unable to act legally for as long as the national law in
question has not been amended.'44
In its judgment of December 12, 1996, the Court of Justice
held that Article 9(1) (c) means that a Member State may not, on
a decreasing basis and for a limited period, authorize the cap-
ture of certain protected species in order to enable bird fanciers
to stock their aviaries. This is where breeding and reproduction
of those species in captivity are possible but are not yet practical
on a large scale by reason of the fact that many fanciers would be
compelled to alter their installations and change their habits. 145
National authorities are authorized under Article 9(1) (c), how-
ever, to permit the capture of protected species with a view to
obviating, in bird breeding for recreational purposes, the
problems of consanguinity. The problems would result from too
many endogenous crossings. On condition that there is no
other satisfactory solution, it is understood that the number of
specimens that may be captured must be fixed at the level of that
proves to be objectively necessary.' 46
2. Environmental Impact Assessment
Among Community laws concerning environmental protec-
tion, Council Directive 85/337117 concerning the assessment of
the effects of certain public and private projects on the environ-
ment offers the most instructive example for administrative obli-
gations. The directive does not contain any material standards
for protection but is designed to promote public involvement in
decision-making processes in all planning procedures where an
143. Id. at 1-1248-50, 1 18-23.
144. Id. at 1251, 24-26; Maria Clara Maffei, Hunting in Italy: Freedom of Move-
ment, 2 EUR. ENVWL. L. REV. 46 (1993).
145. Ligue Royale Beige pour la Protection des Oiseaux v. Region Wallone, Case
C-10/96, [1996] E.C.R. 1-6775.
146. Id. at 1-6800-01, 1 22, 27.
147. Council Directive No. 85/337, OJ. L 175/40 (1985).
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environmental impact assessment is required.1 48 Because of the
complexity of the directive and the subject matter, all Member
States have experienced a great number of difficulties with re-
gard to the legislative implementation of Directive 85/337. In
most cases, legislative implementation has required important
changes in national rules of administrative procedure, 149 as well
as the establishment of new channels of communication.1 50
Those rules are often very complex owing to their regional na-
ture and do not always refer to the same criteria as Directive 85/
337 and may contain omissions or deviations.
In addition, even if implementing legislation has been en-
acted, the question of whether administrative authorities are
under a duty to give priority to the stipulations of the directive
can still arise. Such questions may arise, for example, where do-
mestic law is unclear, incomplete, or has not made the choices
offered by the directive.1 51
In the latter case, the problem is whether Community law
requires administrative authorities to make those choices as long
as the national legislature has not acted. With respect to gaps or
unclear provisions of implementing legislation, the question is
whether administrative authorities are under a duty to interpret
domestic law in a way that is in conformity with the directive and
use all means of interpretation so as to achieve the results as
intended by the Community legislator. 152
Article 2(1) of the directive provides that "Member States
shall adopt all measures necessary to ensure that, before consent
is given, projects likely to have significant effects on the environ-
148. Claude Lambrechts, Environmental Assessment, in EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 63 (1996); Eckard Rehbinder, General Report on the
Status of Transposition and Implementation of the Directive on Environmental Impact Assess-
ment, in LICENSING PROCEDURES FOR INDUSTRIAL PLANTS AND INFLUENCES OF EC-DIREC-
TIVES 9 (1993); CHRISTOPHER WOOD, ENVIRONMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT: A COMPARATIVE
REVIEW (1995).
149. Hans-Joachim Peters, The Significance of Environmental Precaution in the E.I.A.
Directive, 6 EUR. ENVTL. L. Rv. 210 (1996).
150. Commission v. Germany, Case C-301/95, (ECJ Oct. 22, 1998) (not yet re-
ported) 18-24 (holding that Member States are obliged to collect information from
all national authorities in charge of impact assessment procedures and to transmit that
information to Commission).
151. HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, IMPLE-
MENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION, vols. I & II (1992).
152. NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR THE PREPARATION AND IMPLEMEN-
TATION OF COMMUNITY DECISIONS (Spyros Pappas ed., 1995).
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ment by virtue inter alia of their nature, size or location are made
subject to an assessment with regard to their effects." According
to Article 2(2), "the environmental impact assessment may be
integrated into the existing procedures for consent to projects in
the Member States, or failing this, into other procedures or into
procedures to be established to comply with the aim of this Di-
rective." Annexes I and II of the directive list those projects in
which an environmental impact assessment either must always
be carried out (Annex I) or must be carried out "where Member
States consider that their characteristics so require" (Annex II).
In relation to Annex II projects, Article 4(2) provides that "Mem-
ber States may inter alia specify certain types of projects as being
subject to an assessment or may establish the criteria and/or
thresholds necessary to determine which of the projects of the
classes listed in Annex II are to be subject to an assessment."
As shown above, after the expiration of the implementation
period, administrative authorities are under a duty to give full
effect to the provisions of the directive that are sufficiently clear,
precise, and unconditional.15 This obligation does not depend
on a prior ruling of the Court of Justice holding the relevant
provisions to be directly effective.154
The first case relating to Directive 85/337 was decided in
1994.155 The plaintiffs objected to the construction of a section
of a new federal highway and a by-pass in Bavaria. In their appli-
cation, the plaintiffs sought the annulment of the two planning
approval decisions. The environmental impact assessment pro-
cess was introduced into German law on August 1, 1990. Article
12 of the directive, however, provides that Member States shall
take the measures necessary to comply with the directive within
three years of its notification, in other words, by July 3, 1988.156
The Bavarian Court doubted whether the provisions of the
153. Deirdre Curtin, The Province of Government: Delimiting the Direct Effect of Direc-
tives in the Common Law Context, 15 EUR. L. Rxv. 195 (1990); Deirdre Curtin, Directives:
The Effectiveness of Judicial Protection of Individual Rights, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 709
(1990); Peter Duffy, Damages Against the State: A New Remedy for Failure to Implement Com-
munity Obligations, 17 EUR. L. REv. 133 (1992).
154. Ludwig Krhmer, The Implementation of Community Environmental Directives
Within Member States: Some Implications for the Direct Effects Doctrine, 3 J. ENVrL. L. 39, 48
(1991).
155. Bund Naturschutz in Bayern eV, Richard Stahnsdorf and Others v. Freistaat
Bayern, Case C-396/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-3717.
156. Id. at 1-3749, 9.
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implementing German law could be reconciled with Directive
85/337. The court therefore raised a series of questions con-
cerning the interpretation of this directive since the planning
approvals were given without an environmental impact assess-
ment. National legislation implementing the directive excluded
from its scope planning procedures in respect of which public
notice was given before national rules were implemented. In
other words, the Court of Justice was asked to establish whether
the Member State concerned was obliged to apply national
measures implementing Directive 85/337 to a planning proce-
dure initiated after the date for implementation of the directive
but before the date on which national implementing measures
came into force.
This case, therefore, raised the question whether the provi-
sions of Directive 85/337 are sufficiently clear and precise re-
garding the required procedures adopted by the planning au-
thorities. The case also questioned whether national implement-
ing measures are needed to lay down in detail the ways and
means by which the required consultations with public authori-
ties are to take place.157
If a directive lacks the clarity and precision needed to im-
pose procedural requirements upon a competent authority in
the absence of domestic implementing measures, the failure of a
national body to comply with the procedural requirements of
the directive in a case where no national implementing meas-
ures are applicable cannot, as a matter of Community law, give
rise to a right of individuals to challenge the measure in national
proceedings. It does not follow, however, that the directive is
incapable of having legal consequences in such a case because
national rules should be construed so as to give effect to relevant
directives, whether the national rules in question predate or
postdate the relevant directive.15
If the competent planning authority has discretion under
domestic law to take account of environmental considerations in
the course of planning procedures conducted pursuant to na-
tional measures implementing Directive 85/337, then it might
157. Id. at 1-3751-52, 15.
158. Deirdre Curtin & Kamiel Mortelmans, Application and Enforcement of Commu-
nity Law by the Member States: Actors in Search of a Third Generation Scipt, in INSTITUTIONAL
DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HENRY G. SCHERMERS, vol.
II, at 423, 428 (1994).
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be possible for the competent authority to approximate in prac-
tice the result contemplated by the directive. 159 Furthermore, it
could be argued before a national court that a failure of the
competent authority to exercise its discretion in such a way as to
approximate as far as possible the outcome of national proce-
dures to the result contemplated by the Directive is in violation
of Community law. The possibility cannot be excluded that the
failure to exercise such discretion as exists under national law
might give grounds for the annulment of a planning consent if
the competent authority failed to take advantage of that margin
of discretion as were available to it to assess the impact of a pro-
ject upon the environment.160
The next question is whether Article 12(1) of the directive
permits a Member State to exempt projects in respect of which
the consent procedure was initiated before the entry into force
of the national law transposing the directive, from the European
requirements concerning an environmental impact assessment.
Here, the Court of Justice pointed out that there is nothing in
the Directive that could be construed as authorizing Member
States to exempt these projects from the procedures prescribed
by Community law.161
The Court of Justice emphasized the binding nature of the
Community provisions for the regional road project. It follows
from this ruling that the competent authorities should have ap-
plied the impact assessment procedures prescribed by the direc-
tive. The Court of Justice confirmed this interpretation of the
directive four years later, 6 2 emphasizing that all consent proce-
dures initiated after the deadline for implementation of Direc-
tive 85/337 must be conducted according to the stipulations of
the directive.
The question of whether a directive may produce adminis-
trative obligations that are independent of the existence of indi-
vidual rights was raised for the first time in an infringement ac-
159. Bart Hessel & Kamiel Mortelmans, Decentralized Government and Community
Law: Conflicting Institutional Developments?, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 905 (1993).
160. ONNO W. BROUWER ET AL., ENVIRONMENT AND EUROPE: EUROPEAN UNION EN-
VIRONMENTAL LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON INDUSTRY 59 (1994).
161. Bund Naturschutz in Bayern eV Richard Stahnsdorf and Others v. Freistaat
Bayern, Case C-396/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-3717, 1-3753-54, 18-20.
162. Burgemeester en wethouders van Haarlemmerliede en Spaarnwoude and
Others v. Gedeputeerde Staten van Noord-Holland, Case C-81/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-
3923.
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tion brought by the European Commission against Germany. 163
It was one of the exceptional cases where an individual situation
of non-compliance with a directive was brought before the Court
of Justice under Article 169 of the EC Treaty. The Commission
had argued that a regional authority in Germany had infringed
various provisions of Directive 85/337 by not carrying out envi-
ronmental impact assessment proceedings before construction
of a power station was approved. 16 4
The German Government challenged the admissibility of
the action, arguing that only legislative non-implementation,
rather than non-compliance, in individual situations may be re-
ferred to the Court of Justice under Article 169 of the EC
Treaty.165 The Court of Justice rejected this challenge, holding
that a Member State may not plead the fact that it failed to take
the necessary measures to implement a directive in order to pre-
vent the Court of Justice from dealing with an application for a
declaration that it has failed to fulfill a specific flowing from that
directive.166 The German Government also submitted that only
provisions of a directive may have direct effect when they create
rights for individuals and that Articles 2, 3, and 8 of Directive
85/337 do not confer such rights. The British Government sup-
ported the German position, arguing that direct effect of a direc-
tive expresses the capacity of a legal provision to give rise to
rights in individuals to rely upon that provision as against the
addressee of the directive in question.1 6 7
In its judgment of August 11, 1995, the Court ofJustice held
that the existence of administrative obligations to comply with
precise stipulations of a directive is "quite separate from the
question whether individuals may rely as against the State on
provisions of an unimplemented directive which are uncondi-
tional and sufficiently clear and precise, a right which has been
recognized by the Court of Justice."'6 8 These few words contain
the key statement of the Court of Justice. Accordingly, there is
no link between the obligations imposed upon Member States by
163. Commission v. Germany, Case C-431/92, (1995] E.C.R. 1-2189, [1996] 1
C.M.L.R. 196.
164. Id. at 1-2213, 1, [1996] C.M.L.R. at 216.
165. Id. at 1-2219, 19, [1996] C.M.L.R. at 219.
166. Id. at 1-2219-20, It 19-23, [1996] C.M.L.R. at 219-20.
167. Id. at 1-2220, 24, [1996] C.M.L.R. at 220.
168. Id. at 1-2220-21, 26, [1996] C.M.L.R. at 220-21.
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virtue of Community directives and the rights of individuals that
may be derived from those instruments.
The Court of Justice also held that Articles 2, 3, and 8 of the
directive "unequivocally impose[d] on the national authorities
responsible for granting consent an obligation to carry out an
environmental impact assessment. ' 169 The Court of Justice did
not address the question whether the directive conferred rights
on individuals, nor did it even use the words "direct effect." The
action failed, however, because the Commission showed that the
procedures carried out by the German authorities fell short of
what the directive required.
1 70
One year later, the Court of Justice again addressed the im-
pact of Directive 85/337 on local planning procedures.1 7 ' This
dispute concerned a Dutch zoning plan in connection with dike
reinforcement measures. In the contested decision, the Provin-
cial Executive considered that the line of the dike set out in the
zoning plan was the outcome of a policy appraisal conducted in
connection with the implementation of the Dutch Delta Law
under the auspices of the Province through the coordination
commission on dike reinforcement, which had weighed all types
of factors against each other. Under the Delta Law, works are to
be carried out in order to safeguard the land against high storm
water so as to strengthen the high-water embankment. The
plaintiffs whose business properties were affected by the zoning
plan argued that the administrative decisions were in violation of
Directive 85/337.172
The Dutch court, therefore, raised various questions on the
interpretation of that directive. One such question was whether
Articles 2(1) and 4(2) required that, if a Member State in its
national implementing legislation lays down wrong specifica-
tions or criteria within the meaning of Article 4(2) for a project
listed in Annex II, then an obligation exists due to Article 2(1)
that subjects the project to an environment impact assessment if
the project is likely to have "significant effects on the environ-
ment by virtue of inter alia of [its] nature, size, or location." In
the event that this question was answered in the affirmative, the
169. Id. at 1-2224, 39-40, [1996] C.M.L.R. at 222-23.
170. Id. at 1-2225-26, 1 43-45, [1996] C.M.L.R. at 223-24.
171. Aannemersbedrijf P.K Kraaijeveld BV and Others v. Gedeputeerde Statenvan
Zuid-Holland, Case C-72/95, [1996] E.C.R. 1-5403, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 1.
172. Id. at 1-5439, 11 17, 18, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. at 29.
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Dutch court asked whether that obligation has direct effect, so
that it can be invoked by an individual before a national court
and accordingly has to be applied by the competent authori-
ties. 1
7 3
In its judgment of October 24, 1996, the Court of Justice
noted that Article 2(1) of the directive refers to Article 4 for the
definition of projects that must undergo an assessment of their
effects. Article 4(2) allows Member States a certain amount of
discretion because it states that projects of the classes listed in
Annex II are to be subject to an assessment "where Member
States consider that their characteristics so require" and that, to
that end, Member States may, inter alia, specify certain types of
projects as being subject to an assessment. In the alternative,
Member States may establish criteria for determining the
projects that will be subject to an assessment.1 74
The limitations of that discretionary power, however, are to
be found in the obligation set out in Article 2(1) that projects
that are likely, by virtue of their nature, size, or location, to have
significant effects on the environment are to be subject to an
impact assessment. 175 The Court of Justice therefore stressed
that a Member State that establishes criteria or thresholds at a
level such that, in practice, all projects relating to dikes would be
exempted in advance from the requirements of an impact assess-
ment would exceed the limits of its discretion under Articles
2(1) and 4(2). The Member State would overstep its discretion-
ary power unless all projects excluded could, when viewed as a
whole, be regarded as not being likely to have significant effects
on the environment.
176
The Court of Justice considered the question of whether a
national court dealing with an action for the annulment of a de-
cision approving a zoning plan is required to raise its own mo-
tion. The Court of Justice also considered the issue of whether
an environmental impact assessment should have been carried
out pursuant to Article 2(1) and Article 4(2) of the directive.
The Court of Justice recalled that the obligation of a Member
State to take all the measures necessary to achieve the result pre-
173. Id. at 1-5440, 20, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. at 29.
174. Id. at 1-5449, 48, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. at 35.
175. Id. at 1-5450, 50, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. at 35; Commission v. Belgium, Case C-
133/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-2323, 1-2351, t 41-43.
176. Kraaijeveld, at 1-5451, 1 53.
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scribed by a directive is a binding obligation imposed by Article
189 of the EC Treaty and by the directive itself. This duty is
binding on all the authorities of Member States. 1 7 7
Regarding the rights of individuals to invoke the provision
of a directive, the Court ofJustice considered case law suggesting
that it would be incompatible with the binding effect attributed
to a directive by Article 189 of the EC Treaty to exclude, in prin-
ciple, the possibility that the obligation that it imposes may be
invoked by those concerned. The Court of Justice stressed that
where the Community authorities have, by directive, imposed on
Member States the obligation to pursue a particular course of
conduct, the useful effect of such an act would be weakened if
individuals were prevented from relying on it before their na-
tional courts. Such an act would also be weakened if the courts
were prevented from taking it into consideration as an element
of Community law in order to rule whether the national legisla-
ture, in exercising the choice open to it as to the form and meth-
ods for implementation, has kept within the limits of its discre-
tion set out in the directive. 17' The Court of Justice added that
"the fact that in this case the Member States have a discretion
under Articles 2(1) and 4(2) of the directive does not preclude
judicial review of the question whether the national authorities
exceeded their discretion." 179
It follows from this ruling that Directive 85/337 does not
create a direct effect in the sense of conferring enforceable
rights on individuals to require an environmental impact assess-
ment for an Annex II project, even if the particular project in
question was likely to have significant effects on the environ-
ment. On the other hand, the directive is not, for this reason,
prevented from having some effect because of its non-implemen-
tation. The individual has thus a procedural right through the
obligation of the national court to have the national implement-
ing provisions reviewed, but not a substantive right to require an
environmental impact assessment to be carried out before con-
struction of the dike could begin. In other words, the right rec-
ognized was not to secure any positive remedy or to have a par-
ticular result achieved, but rather the right to call for judicial
177. Id. at 1-5451-52, 55 (with references to Court of Justice's jurisprudence).
178. Id. at 1-5452, 56.
179. Id. at 1-5453, 59.
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review or the right to ask the courts to ensure that the national
legislature and executive, when acting in fields covered by a
Community directive, comply with their obligations and do not
exceed the bounds of their permitted discretion.
The national court is thus under a duty to review whether
the national authorities had exceeded their discretion in estab-
lishing national thresholds or criteria. If so, the domestic provi-
sions must be set aside. The national authorities must then take
all the general or particular measures necessary to ensure that
projects are examined to determine whether they are likely to
have significant effects on the environment and, if so, to ensure
that they are subject to an impact assessment. 180
National courts are now required not only to set aside na-
tional laws that are incompatible with clear, precise, and uncon-
ditional Community directives, but also to review the exercise of
Member State's discretion. This clearly elevates the role of na-
tional courts within the Community legal order regarding the
enforcement of Community law obligations against Member
States. 18 1 Consequently, where a court may raise its own motion
pleas pursuant to national law based on a binding national rule
that was not put forward by the parties, it must analyze whether
the legislative or administrative authorities of the Member States
exceeded their discretion under Articles 2(1) and 4(2) of the
directive.
In addition, the court must take account when examining
the action for annulment. If that discretion has been exceeded,
causing the national provisions to be set aside, then the authori-
ties of the Member States, according to their respective powers,
must take all the general or particular measures necessary to en-
sure that projects are examined in order to determine whether
they are likely to have significant effects on the environment
and, if so, to ensure that they are subject to an impact assess-
ment.
Authorization proceedings regarding important infrastruc-
180. Andrew Geddes, Locus Standi and EEC Environmental Measures, 1 J. ENVTL. L.
29 (1992); EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ADMINISTRATIVE STRUcTURES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1993).
181. Peterbroeck Van Campenhout & Cie SCS v. Belgium, Case C-312/93, [1995]
E.C.R. 1-4599, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 793; Jeroen van Schijndel & Johannes van Veen v.
Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten, Joined Cases C-430-431/93, [1995]
E.C.R. 1-4705, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 801.
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ture projects often involve numerous parties and oblige local or
regional authorities to take into account requirements as estab-
lished by Directive 85/337. Pending case C-435/97 182 provides a
good example. It is also the first reference for a preliminary rul-
ing drafted in German by the administrative court for the Ger-
man-speaking Bolzano province of Italy. The dispute concerns
the procedure for the approval of a project for the reconstruc-
tion of the Bolzano Airport. In particular, the Court of Justice
considered a decision of the Regional Government of the Auton-
omous Province of Bolzano-South Tirol. The works and facilities
proposed were the renewal and extension of the existing run-
way, construction of access roads, car parks, a control tower, a
departure building, and a hangar. The Italian administrative
court considered whether, if the directive has been incorrectly
transposed, Article 4(2) in conjunction with Article 2(1) is self-
executing in the sense that the authorities of the Member State
are required to subject the projects at issue to an environmental
assessment."' 3
3. Access to Information
Article 6 of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive
requires that information gathered in connection with the rele-
vant procedures is made available to the public. It also mandates
that "the public concerned is given the opportunity to express
an opinion before the project is initiated." Five years later, the
Council adopted a more far-reaching legal instrument designed
to enhance the individual's ability to bring legal action in this
field."8 4 This directive grants an individual right of access to in-
formation and entitles every person who considers that a request
for information has been unreasonably refused, ignored, or in-
adequately answered by a public authority, to seek judicial or ad-
ministrative review of the decision in accordance with the rele-
vant national legal system. The directive is one of the Commu-
nity instruments that is about to provoke profound changes in
national administrative law. For example, Article 3 establishes a
182. Case C-435/97, O.J. C 72/ 5 (1998) (pending case).
183. See Linster and Others, C-287/98, OJ. C 299/17 (1998) (pending case).
184. Council Directive No. 90/313, O.J. L 158/56 (1990) (regarding freedom of
access to information on environment).
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right for individuals to receive environmental information that is
in possession of public entities.
There can be very little doubt that this provision can be re-
lied upon by individuals directly even if Article 3 has not been
translated into domestic law provided that no other rights are
affected by disclosure. Problems, however, could arise if a third
party enjoyed some constitutional right to the information re-
quested because of its privileged nature (personal or business
data) and if that third party in addition were able to rely on due
process principles as recognized by constitutional law, such as
the right to be heard before an administrative decision.
In such a situation, the administrative body would be under
an obligation to exercise its powers of scrutiny under domestic
law and also follow the internal procedure of legal control estab-
lished by Article 4 of Directive 90/313. As far as the final deci-
sion is concerned, however, non-disclosure on grounds of con-
flicting individual constitutional rights would be seen as a proper
legal determination. In such a case, judicial review would be the
forum for the final balancing test. In addition, the Member
States must create a means of review. Article 4 provides for judi-
cial or administrative review where a person is refused the de-
sired environmental information.
In 1998, the Court of Justice dealt for the first time with a
reference for a preliminary ruling as to the construction of this
directive.185 It held that Article 2(a) of Council Directive 90/313
is to be interpreted as covering a statement of views given by a
countryside protection authority in development consent pro-
ceedings if that statement is capable of influencing the outcome
of those proceedings with respect to interests pertaining to the
protection of the environment. 18 6
B. Public Procurement
In its simplest form, public procurement means the
purchase of goods or services by the state. It is subject to rules at
the Community level, with the aim of creating tendering proce-
dures that are transparent and do not place suppliers in other
Member States at a disadvantage. Regulation is considered to be
185. Wilhelm Mecklenburg v. Kreis Pinneberg-Der Landrat, Case C-321/96,
[1998] E.C.R. 1-3809.
186. Id. at 1-3833, 22.
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necessary in order to counteract closed markets and the ten-
dency of the State to influence the procurement of public bodies
as a means of favoring national industry at the expense of suppli-
ers located elsewhere in the Community.
1 8 7
Although equality in public procurement procedures is im-
portant to the achievement of the single market, the EC Treaty
does not contain any specific provision governing this field and,
consequently, European legislation is primarily to be found in
the various directives relating to procurement adopted since
1971. In order to make adequate provision for the different con-
siderations required to regulate public works, public supplies,
and services, the procurement directives were adopted by the
Council dealing with each of the different subject matters. They
lay down specific requirements as to the procedures to follow
before public contracts are awarded.
The rules regarding participation and advertising in direc-
tives coordinating the awarding of public contracts are intended
to protect tenderers against arbitrariness on the part of the con-
tract-awarding authority. Such protection cannot be effective if
a tenderer is not able to rely on those rules as against the con-
tract awarder and, if necessary, to plead a breach of those rules
before national courts. 188
The objective of Directive 71/305 is to coordinate national
procedures for the award of public works contracts concluded in
Member States on behalf of the State, regional, or local authori-
ties and of other legal persons governed by public law. The wide
scope of the notion of "authorities awarding contracts" in Arti-
cle 1 (b) of the directive is evidenced by a 1992 ruling of the
187. Commission v. Ireland, Case 45/87, [1988] E.C.R. 4929; Du Pont de Nemours
Italiana SpA v. Unita Sanitaria Locale No. 2 di Carrara, Case C-21/88, [1990] E.C.R. I-
889, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 25.
188. The most important recent legal instruments are the following: Council Di-
rective No. 89/665/EEC (1989), O.J. L 395/33 (1989) (concerning coordination of
laws, regulations, and administrative provisions relating to application of review proce-
dures to award of public supply and public works contracts); Council Directive No. 90/
531/EEC (1990), OJ. L 297/1 (1990) (concerning procurement procedures of entities
operating in water, energy, transport, and telecommunications sectors); Council Direc-
tive No. 92/50/EEC (1992), O.J. L 209/1 (1992), O.J. L 199/84 (1993) (relating to
coordination of procedures for award of public service contracts); Council Directive
No. 93/38/EEC (1993) (coordinating procurement procedures of entities operating in
water, energy, transport, and telecommunications sectors).
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Court of Justice,' 89 which involved the Complutense University
in Madrid. The Court of Justice held that the university had vio-
lated Articles 9, 12, 13, 14, and 15 of Directive 71/305 when it
awarded contracts for the extension and renovation of buildings
for the Faculty of Political Science and Sociology.190
Due to the public nature of most academic institutions in
Europe, they are covered by the various EC procurement direc-
tives. A case pending before the Court of Justice involves the
applicability of Article 1 of Directive 92/50/EEC, 93/36/EEC,
and 93/37/EEC to the University of Cambridge as a "con-
tracting authority."19' The above-mentioned definition compre-
hensively describes the state and all organs exercising state de-
192rived powers.
In addition, Article 2 (1) (a) of Council Directive 90/531 has
introduced the concept of "public undertaking," which is also
covered by Community law and which is defined as "any under-
taking over which the public authorities may exercise directly or
indirectly a dominant influence by virtue of their ownership of
it, their financial participation therein, or the rules which govern
it." A dominant influence will be presumed on the part of pub-
lic authorities where they hold a major part of the undertaking's
capital, control the majority of voting shares, or where they may
appoint more than half of the members of the undertaking's ad-
ministrative, managerial, or supervisory bodies.
This is consistent with the purpose of the procurement di-
rectives, namely, to ensure that public procurement is carried
out in a manner free from government influence that might
cause the entity in question to procure on a nationalistic or a
discriminatory basis. For that purpose, the Council enacted a
special directive on the coordination of the laws, regulations,
and administrative provisions relating to the application of re-
view procedures to the award of public supply and public works
contracts.19
In 1993, the new supplies Directive 93/3619" was enacted.
189. Commission v. Spain, Case C-24/91, [1992] E.C.R. 1-1989, [1994] 2 C.M.L.R.
621.
190. Id. at 1-2006, 16, [1994] 2 C.M.L.R. at 632.
191. Case C-380/98, O.J. C 397/20 (1998) (pending case).
192. See Council Directive No. 80/723, O.J. L 195/35 (1980).
193. Council Directive No. 89/665/EEC, O.J. L 395/33 (1989).
194. Council Directive No. 93/36/EEC, O.J. L 199/1 (1993) (coordinating proce-
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This directive aligns the definition of contracting authorities to
that contained in the works directive. To that end, the works
directive definition of contracting authorities in Article 1 (b) pro-
vides that "contracting authorities" shall be the state, regional, or
local authorities, bodies governed by public law, associations
formed by one or several of such authorities, or bodies governed
by public law. These include the following entities:
" those established for the specific purpose of meeting needs
in the general interest, not having an industrial or commer-
cial character,
" those having legal personality, and
* those financed, for the most part, by the state, or regional or
local authorities, or other bodies governed by public law, or
subject to management supervision by those bodies, or hav-
ing an administrative, managerial or supervisory board,
more than half of whose members are appointed by the
state, regional or local authorities, or by other bodies gov-
erned by public law.
The same definition is contained in Council Directive 93/
3795 of June 14, 1993, concerning the coordination of proce-
dures for the award of public works contracts. The Court ofJus-
tice's judgment ofJanuary 15, 1998, confirmed that the Austrian
State Printing Office is a "body governed by public law."' 9 6 In a
similar ruling, the Court of Justice held the Regional Assembly
of Flanders to be in violation of the same directive. 197
As shown by those examples, administrative compliance
with EC public procurement rules is probably more important
than judicial review of administrative decisions.198 Once a con-
tract has been awarded, there are obvious limits to the remedies
that might be available in judicial proceedings. Administrative
dures for award of public supply contracts). In Pending Case C-27/98, the Austrian
Federal Procurement Office has asked the Court of Justice whether Article 18 of this
Directive is sufficiently specific and precise to be relied on by individuals in proceedings
under national law and, as part of Community law, to be used to oppose provisions of
national law. O.J. C 94/13 (1998).
195. O.J. L 199/54 (1993).
196. Mannesmann Anlagenbau Austria AG and Others v. Strohal Rotationsdruck
GesmbH, Case C-44/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-73, 1-112, 1-115, 11 17, 29.
197. Commission v. Belgium, Case C-323/96 (ECJ Sept. 17, 1998) (not yet re-
ported).
198. Commission v. Germany, Case C-433/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-2305.
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respect of Community law is especially important in this field
because judicial review may not provide for adequate financial
relief if a public contract has been illegally awarded. Problems
regarding the administrative implementation and application of
EC public procurement directives have since been raised in a
great number of infringement actions since 1976.199
One of the key provisions of the first public procurement
directive is Article 29(5) of Directive 71/305, which provides the
following:
If, for a given contract, tenders are obviously abnormally low
in relation to the transaction, the authority awarding con-
tracts shall examine the details of the tenders before deciding
to whom it will award the contract. The result of this exami-
nation shall be taken into account.
For this purpose it shall request the tenderer to furnish the
necessary explanations and, where appropriate, it shall indi-
cate which parts it finds unacceptable.200
In 1982, the Court of Justice held with regard to Article 29, that
the directive's rules concerning participation and advertising are
intended to protect tenderers against arbitrariness on the part of
the public authority awarding the contract.21 To that end, the
directive sets out requirements regarding publication. Because
no specific implementing measure is necessary for compliance
with those requirements, the resulting obligations incumbent on
the Member States are sufficiently precise and unconditional.
The directive's rules concerning participation and advertising
are intended to protect tenderers against arbitrariness on the
part of the public authorities awarding the contract.
The Court of Justice takes the view that the significance of
the provisions of Directive 71/305 extends beyond the mere har-
monization of laws. By restricting the discretionary nature of de-
cisions regarding participation on a tender procedure and en-
suring their transparency, those provisions seek to give undertak-
ings in the Community equal access to the activities in question
without any overt or disguised discrimination. Consequently,
199. See Commission v. Italy, Case C-272/91, [1994] E.C.R. 1-1409 (dealing with
introduction of computerized lottery system by Italian Finance Ministry).
200. Council Directive No. 71/305/EEC, art. 29(5), 185J.O. 5 (1971), O.J. Eng.
Spec. Ed. 1971, at 682.
201. SA Transporoute et Travaux v. Minister of Public Works, Case 76/81, [1982]
E.C.R. 417, [1982] 3 C.M.L.R. 382.
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the provisions of Directive 71/305 must be directly applicable
where an individual relies on them in order to protect his right
to participate in the tender procedure.
Article 9 of Directive 71/305 is of special importance. It al-
lows for an exception from the prescribed tender procedure in
case of an "unforeseeable event" or "extreme urgency" that ren-
ders the observance of the time-limit laid down by other proce-
dures impossible. This provision, however, must be construed
narrowly. 2  As may be inferred from the Court ofJustice'sjuris-
prudence, Article 9 of Directive 71/305 is directly applicable.20 3
Member States are also required to provide for appropriate legis-
lative implementation so as to enable companies to know their
rights in procurement procedures. Internal administrative in-
structions are not sufficient in that respect. 20 4
In the first judgment based upon a reference for a prelimi-
nary ruling in the field of public procurement,205 the Court of
Justice addressed whether a body that was an administrative au-
thority independent of the state was covered by the public pro-
curement rules. The Court of Justice stated that a body that was
not technically part of the state administration would nonethe-
less be regarded as a state body where its composition and func-
tions were laid down by legislation and where it depended on
the authorities for the appointment of its members, the obser-
vance of the obligations arising out of its measures, and the fi-
nancing of the public works contracts that it awarded. 20 6 This
judgment also emphasized that the rules of Directive 71/305 on
the economic and technical suitability of candidates, as well as
on the criteria to be used for the award and on the publication
of these criteria (Articles 20, 26, and 29) may be invoked by an
individual before national courts. 2 0 7
The key judgment in the field of public procurement is the
202. Commission v. Italy, Case 107/92, [1993] E.C.R. 1-4655.
203. Commission v. Italy, Case 199/85, [1987] E.C.R. 1039; Commission v. Greece,
Case C-79/94, [1995] E.C.R. 1-1071, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 134.
204. Commission v. Germany, Case C-433/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-2303, 1-2317-18, it
17-24.
205. Gebroeders Beentes BV v. Netherlands, Case 31/87, [1988] E.C.R. 4635,
[1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 287.
206. Id. at 4655, 11-12, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. at 301-02.
207. Id. at 4661-63, 11 38-44, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. at 306-07.
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Costanzo2 °a ruling of June 22, 1989. This case concerned the
award of a construction contract to extend, modernize, and roof
a soccer stadium in the City of Milan for the 1990 World Cham-
pionship. The City Council decided in 1987 that the tendering
procedure for the work should take the form of a restricted invi-
tation to tender. The criterion chosen for awarding the con-
tracts was the greatest discount from the basic amount. The City
Council further decided that tenders that offered a percentage
discount greater than the average percentage divergence of the
tenders admitted plus ten percentage points will be considered
anomalous and considered eliminated.
Fratelli Costanzo, the plaintiff in the national proceedings,
was a member of a consortium of several undertakings that took
part in the tendering procedure. In 1987, the Municipal Execu-
tive Board of Milan disqualified the tender submitted by the con-
sortium of which Costanzo was a member. The decision to dis-
qualify was based upon the consideration that the tender was ab-
normally low. By the same decision, the Municipal Executive
Board awarded the contract to another consortium of undertak-
ings.209
Costanzo challenged the decisions of the Municipal Execu-
tive Board and the Municipal Council in proceedings before the
competent administrative court. It claimed that the contested
decisions were illegal on the grounds that they were based on a
law that was incompatible with Article 29 (5) of Directive 71/305.
The incompatibility resulted because the law could not provide
for the automatic exclusion of tenders considered abnormally
low due to the directive allowing such expulsion only after the
parties concerned have been heard. The Italian court stayed the
proceedings and submitted several questions to the Court of Jus-
tice for a preliminary ruling. 21°
Among the problems raised by the Italian court was the
question whether administrative authorities, including munici-
pal authorities, are under the same obligation as national courts
to apply Article 29(5) and to refrain from applying provisions of
208. Fratelli Costanzo SpAv. Comune di Milano, Case 103/88, [1989] E.C.R. 1839,
[1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 239.
209. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Fratelli Costanzo SpA v. Comune di Mi-
lano, Case 103/88, [1989] E.C.R. 1839, 1852-53, -11, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 239, 243-44.
210. Id. at 1853, 12, 13, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 244.
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domestic law that are in conflict with Community law.211 In its
answer, the Court of Justice first emphasized that whenever an
individual relies upon "self-executing" provisions of a directive in
a situation of non-implementation in proceedings before a state
court, the same must apply to all other state authorities that are
equally bound by the relevant provisions of a Community Direc-
tive.212 In its key statements the Court of Justice held:
It would, moreover, be contradictory to rule that an indi-
vidual may rely upon the provisions of a Directive which fulfill
the conditions defined above in proceedings before the na-
tional courts seeking an order against the administrative au-
thorities, and yet to hold that those authorities are under no
obligation to apply the provisions of the Directive and refrain
from applying provisions of national law which conflict with
them. It follows that when the conditions under which the
Court has held that individuals may rely on the provisions of a
Directive before the national courts are met, all organs of the
administration, including decentralized authorities such as
municipalities, are obliged to apply those provisions.
With specific regard to Article 29(5) of Directive 71/305,
it is apparent from the discussion of the first question that it
is unconditional and sufficiently precise to be relied upon by
an individual against the State. An individual may therefore
plead that provision before the national courts and, as is clear
from the foregoing, all organs of the administration, includ-
ing decentralized authorities such as municipalities, are
obliged to apply it.
The answer to the fourth question must therefore be that
administrative authorities, including municipal authorities,
are under the same obligation as a national court to apply the
provisions of Article 29(5) of Council Directive 71/305 and to
refrain from applying provisions of national law which con-
flict with them.213
It follows from this ruling that even regional or local administra-
tive bodies are responsible for the proper application of Com-
munity public procurement directives. The reasoning of the
Court of Justice is even more significant as it did not follow the
opinion of the Advocate General, who had rejected the theory
211. Id. at 1856-57, 28, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 247-48.
212. Id. at 1857, 29, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 248.
213. Fratelli Costanzo SpA v. Comune di Milano, Case 103/88, [1989] E.C.R. 1839,
1857, 31-33, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 239, 248.
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that administrative authorities could be bound by Community
directives. He had argued that the risk of "wrong interpreta-
tions" and the lack of adequate legal protection against adminis-
trative action precluded the direct effect of a Community Direc-
tive. The reasoning of the Advocate General was as follows:
The sole question is whether it is possible to oblige them
under Community law to do so. In my view it is not possible,
because it is not open to the administrative authorities to re-
fer the matter to the Court of Justice and obtain a ruling on
the direct applicability of the relevant provision of the Direc-
tive. If it applies the directly applicable provisions of a Direc-
tive and disregards conflicting national law, it does so at its
own risk and without the endorsement of the Court. In my
opinion they are entitled to act in this manner but are not
obliged to do so, because the EC Treaty does not afford it the
requisite legal protection for doing so.214
The Attorney General's arguments do not carry much convic-
tion. First, administrative authorities are under a duty to ex-
amine all relevant points of law before taking a decision. No
distinction can be made between national and Community
law.21' The risk of wrong interpretations therefore concerns
both national and Community law. In any case, that risk is in-
herent in all types of administrative action, and it is accepted
every time the legislator grants jurisdiction over an certain area
of law to an administrative body. Second, all Member States pro-
vide for some kind of internal review of administrative action.
The Court of Justice emphasized the importance of legal
protection of all participants in a public tender, but it did not
take a position on the question of whether third party rights
might constitute an obstacle to the direct effect of Community
directives. Any positive direct effect, however, of a public pro-
curement provision in favor of a company that has been ex-
cluded from the bidding process in violation of the applicable
directive only entails an indirect effect on another company
whose business expectations might be diminished. In any event,
public procurement directives are not directed against any po-
214. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Fratelli, [1989] E.C.R. 1839, 1858, 1 36,
[1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 239, 249.
215. Philip Mead, The Obligation to Apply European Law: Is Duke Dead?, 16 EUR. L.
REv. 490 (1991).
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tential bidder but are rather intended to prevent unjustified ex-
clusions from the bidding process.
Those directly applicable provisions, in fact, often require
the public administration to fulfill certain administrative activi-
ties by reference to the directive itself as the sole, direct, and
immediate discipline. In such a way, these provisions were cre-
ated in favor of the legitimate interests of individuals. An exam-
ple of this can be found in the directive issued for the co-ordina-
tion of national procedures for the award of public works con-
tracts.
This directive contains extremely detailed norms, by means
of which the administrative activity of the state and other public
entities for the award of such contract is disciplined. The direct
norms regulate the contents of the calls for tenders and their
publications and norms that establish the criteria in the award of
the contract. All the provisions center on regulating the exer-
cise of powers by the administration and as such are therefore
apt to create legitimate interests.
Duties deriving from clear, unambiguous, and uncondi-
tional directives can therefore be upheld in front of all authori-
ties of Member States.2 16 It follows that a provision of a directive
that satisfies the conditions for direct effect and that has not
been implemented by national law is binding to all organs of the
administration, including decentralized authorities and munici-
palities.21 v On further analysis, this cannot be seen as an unex-
pected development, if one considers that this conclusion was
already implicit in the position of the Court of Justice on the
powers of national judges when faced with national legislation
contrasting with Community law.21a
During the past seven years, the Commission has brought
an increasing number of infringement actions against Member
States for violations of public procurement directives in individ-
216. Josephine Steiner, From Direct Effect to Francovich: Shifting Means of Enforcement
of Community Law, 18 EUR. L. Rv. 3 (1993);John Temple Lang, New Legal Effects Result-
ing from the Failure of States to Fulfill Obligations Under European Community Law: The
FrancovichJudgment, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (1992).
217. Stichting Uitvoering Financiele Acties v. Staatssecretaris van Financien, Case
348/87, [1989] E.C.R. 1737, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 429.
218. Eric Stein,Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM.J. INT'L
L. 1 (1981).
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ual cases. 219 In addition, the preliminary reference procedure
serves as an avenue ofjurisdiction regarding the implementation
of the EC procurement directives. These developments show
the impact of these EC rules on national administrative proceed-
ings.
In most of these cases the parties accept that the relevant
directives are directly effective and are to be applied by the pub-
lic administration, even though, at the time they enter into
force, they will not yet have been transposed into national law.
The Court of Justice's assessment of procurement directives has
been progressively refined and broadened. For example, the
class of public agencies against which directives can be relied on
has been widened. 220  Among the infringement procedures
brought by the Commission, the most interesting examples are
those that relate to violations of procurement directives by lower
state authorities.
In 1994, the European Commission instituted legal pro-
ceedings against Germany for failing to publish the information
regarding the award of a public contract for dredging work on
the Ems river, as required by European legislation. 221 The Water
and Inland Waterway Navigation Board of the City of Emden
awarded the contract to a German firm through a negotiated
procedure without prior publication of the call for tender in the
Official Journal of the Community.
According to the board, it was urgent to carry out the dredg-
ing work to enable a shipyard to meet its commitments, which in
their opinion justified resorting to an accelerated procedure
without publication in the Official Journal.22 The Court of Jus-
tice rejected the argument of the German authorities that it was
219. Commission v. Italy, Case C-57/94, [1995] E.C.R. 1-1249, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R.
679; Commission v. Spain, Case C-328/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1569.
220. Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH v. Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin
mbH, Case C-54/96, [1997] E.C.R. 1-4961, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 237. In its judgment of
September 17, 1998, the Court of Justice dealt with the scope of the direct effect of
Directive 92/50/EEC, O.J. L 209/1 (1992). In particular, the Court ofJustice discussed
whether the procedural remedy available for public supply and public works contracts
had to be available also for public service contracts. The Court ofJustice decided that it
is for the national court to determine whether such a right of appeal may be exercised
before the same bodies as those established to hear appeals concerning the award of
public supply contracts and public works contracts.
221. Commission v. Germany, Case C-318/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1949.
222. Id. at 1-1952-53, 4-5.
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urgent to act, emphasizing that the consequences of any delay in
delivery of a boat could not justify resorting to the negotiated
procedure, especially because the decision to dredge the Ems
had been made in 1989. In addition, the procedures that would
have done less injury to the rights of competing companies if
they had been observed would only have lasted fifty-five days.
The Court of Justice also held that the delay caused by an unex-
pected refusal of the Weser-Ems Regional Authority to grant ap-
proval for the works was not an unforeseeable event.223
Also, the fact that public procurement directives require
Member States to establish independent bodies responsible for
review procedures brings awarding authorities closer to the
reach of Community law. Two instructive examples are provided
by recent Austrian references for preliminary rulings. In its
judgment of September 24, 1988,224 the Court of Justice dealt
with the effects of Directive 89/665 on procedures for public
supply and public service contracts and Directive 92/50 relating
to the award of public service contracts upon a regional sickness
insurance fund that had excluded the plaintiff from the bidding
process for the award of a transportation contract. The Court of
Justice affirmed that the insurance fund was bound by the stipu-
lations of both directives and that the plaintiff was entitled to
rely upon the provisions of Directive 92/50 in the absence of
domestic legislation implementing Community law.22 5
Another judgment decided the same day 2 2 6 concerned an
invitation to tender for the supply of buses for regional transpor-
tation services. In that judgment, the Federal Procurement Of-
fice of Austria asked the Court of Justice whether an individual
may derive from Directive 92/13 regulations and administrative
provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the
procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, en-
ergy, transport, and telecommunications sectors. 227 The Federal
Procurement Office questioned whether a specific right existed
to have review proceedings conducted before authorities, courts,
223. Id. at 1-1954-57, 14-20.
224. Walter T6gel v. Niederoesterreichische Gebietskrankenkasse, Case C-76/97
(ECJ Sept. 24, 1998) (not yet reported).
225. Id., slip op. at 1-12, 42-47.
226. EvoBus Austria GmbH v. Niederoesterreichische Verkehrsorganisations
GmbH, Case C-111/97 (ECJ Sept. 24, 1998) (not yet reported).
227. Council Directive No. 92/13, OJ. L 76/14 (1992).
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or tribunals complying with Article 2(9) of that Directive, which
is so precise and specific that, in the event of non-transposition
by a Member State, the individual may rely on the provision. In
addition, the Federal Office requested that the Court of Justice
determine whether the adjudicating court must disregard proce-
dural provisions of national law if they impede or prevent a re-
view procedure from being effectively conducted.228
The Court of Justice held that in order to construct domes-
tic law in conformity with Directive 92/13 and to protect the
rights of individuals effectively, the national court must deter-
mine whether the relevant provisions of its domestic law allow
recognition of a right for individuals to bring review proceedings
in relation to awards of public contracts in the water, energy,
transport, and telecommunications sectors. 22 9  The national
court must, in particular, verify whether the right to bring review
proceedings can be exercised before the same bodies as those
established to hear applications for review concerning the award
of public supply contracts and public works contracts. The
Court of Justice added that if domestic law cannot be con-
structed in conformity with the stipulations of Community law,
the aggrieved individual is entitled to claim compensation for
the damage suffered as a result of the failure to transpose the
directive within the prescribed time limit.230
There are cases in which national courts have indepen-
dently recognized the direct applicability of the public procure-
ment directives. 231 Also, several preliminary references pending
before the Court of Justice are based upon the assumption that
lower state authorities are bound by EC directives on public con-
tracts.
2 3 2
228. EvoBus Austria, slip op. at 1-6, 13.
229. Id., slip op. at 1-7-8, 19.
230. Id., slip op. at 1-8, 21-22.
231. SeeJudgment of the Audiencia Territorial de Cdceres, Sala de lo Contencioso
Administrativo (1988), reported inJ.E. Soriano, Comunidades Aut6nomas, Comunidades
Europeas y Tribunal Constitucional, 29 REviSTA DE Du1RrCHO POBLICO 9, 11 (1989).
232. Case C-258/97, OJ. C 271/9 (1997) (pending case) (concerning questions
raised by Independent Administrative Senate for Carinthia (Austria) regarding effects
of Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/50/EEC upon regional hospital); Case C-264/97,
O.J. C 271/10 (1997) (pending case) (regarding questions raised by Administrative
Court of Justice of Sardinia regarding obligations of City of Cagliari resulting from Di-
rective 92/50/EEC); Connemara Machine Turf Co. Ltd. V. Coillte Teoranta, Case C-
306/97 (ECJ Dec. 17, 1998) (not yet reported) (holding that Coillte Teorante, Irish
Foresting Board, is contracting authority within meaning of Article 1(b) of Directive
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C. Deportation of Foreign Nationals on Grounds of Public Security
The free movement of persons within the common market
is guaranteed by Article 48 of the EC Treaty. Pursuant to Article
48(3), however, states retain certain reserve powers relating to
public policy, public security, and public health, which may be
employed to limit that freedom. Directive 64/221 was created to
implement that provision and to secure the coordination of na-
tional measures concerning the movement of foreign nation-
als.2 33 It applies to all measures affecting entry into a Member
State, issue and renewal of residence permits, and expulsion of
foreign nationals.234
The Court of justice, however, has emphasized that the
power to derogate from the fundamental principle of free move-
ment is exceptional and must be interpreted restrictively. 23 5 The
provisions of the directive are therefore designed to limit the
discretionary power of national police authorities. 36 Individuals
may consequently invoke those provisions in administrative and
judicial proceedings against measures of national police authori-
ties restricting the free movement of persons in the Commu-
nity.237
The key judgment in this field is the 1974 ruling of the
Court of Justice in the Van Duyn case. 23 "8 The Court of Justice
held that the terms of Directive 64/221 regarding the legal
grounds allowing deportation of an EC citizen from a Member
State are preemptory. The Court of Justice emphasized that
77/62/EEC). In another judgment from the same day, Commission v. Ireland, Case C-
353/96 (ECJ Dec. 17, 1998) (not yet reported), the Court of Justice found the defend-
ing Member State in violation of Directive 76/62/EEC because Coillte Teorante failed
to give a notice of tender upon a contract for the supply of fertilizer, published in the
Official Journal as required by Council Directive No. 76/62/EEC.
233. Council Directive No. 64/221/EEC, O.J. L 850/117 (1964) (concerning coor-
dination of special measures for movement and residence of foreign nationals that are
justified on grounds of public policy, public security, or public health).
234. Italy v. Watson and Belmann, Case 118/75, [1976] E.C.R. 1185, [1976] 2
C.M.L.R. 552.
235. Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, Case 36/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1219, [1976] 1
C.M.L.R. 140.
236. Bonsignore v. Oberstadtdirektor of the City of Cologne, Case 67/74, [1975]
E.C.R. 297, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 472.
237. Pecastaing v. Belgian State, Case 98/79, [1980] E.C.R. 691, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R.
685; Adoui and Cornuaille v. Belgian State and City of Liege, Case 116/81, [1982]
E.C.R. 1665, [1982] 3 C.M.L.R. 631.
238. Van Duyn v. Home Office, Case 41/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1337, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R.
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measures taken on grounds of public policy or security should
be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual
concerned." 9 This ruling is a clear mandate for police authori-
ties, which are directly bound by the Court of Justice's interpre-
tation of Community law, no matter what kind of measures do-
mestic law might allow. In addition, the Court of Justice held
that individuals must be able to rely on this protective design
before administrative authorities and national courts.
Article 8 of Directive 64/221 ensures that the Community
national gets the same legal remedies as are available to the
state's own citizens, with respect to acts of the administration re-
garding any decision about refusing entry, renewal of a resi-
dence permit, or ordering expulsion.2 4 ° Accordingly, there must
either be full right of appeal with suspended effect going beyond
a mere assessment of the legal validity of the decision or at least
review of the decision to exclude a Community national exercis-
ing or seeking to exercise Treaty rights by an independent au-
thority.
The judicial authority reviewing the decision must be in a
position to examine the facts and circumstances, including the
discretionary factors on which the measure was based. The judi-
cial authority should also be able to determine whether the mea-
sure restricting the right of free movement was proportionate to
the interference of this fundamental right. Judicial review, how-
ever, might not always be the most efficient means to control the
legality of administrative action. This is why Article 9 of Direc-
tive 64/221 deals with situations in which national law does not
provide for judicial review. It requires Member States to provide
for minimum guarantees of administrative due process.
241
239. Id. at 1349-51, 16-24, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 16-18.
240. Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Suninder Singh, Case C-370/90,
[1992] E.C.R. 1-4265, 1-4294, 22, [1992] 3 C.M.L.R. 358, 375.
241. Article 9 of Directive 64/221 provides as follows:
1. Where there is no right of appeal to a court of law, or where such appeal
may be only in respect of the legal validity of the decision, or where the appeal
cannot have suspensory effect, a decision refusing renewal of a residence per-
mit or ordering the expulsion of the holder of a residence permit from the
territory shall not be taken by the administrative authority, save in cases of
urgency, until an opinion has been obtained from a competent authority of
the host country before which the person concerned enjoys such rights of de-
fense and of assistance of representation as the domestic law of that country
provides for.
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It is settled law that the purpose. of Article 9(1) is to ensure
minimum procedural safeguards for persons affected by a deci-
sion refusing renewal of a residence permit or ordering the ex-
pulsion of the holder of a residence permit. That provision ap-
plies where there is no right of appeal to a court of law, or where
such appeal cannot have suspensory effect. It envisages the in-
tervention of a competent authority other than the authority em-
powered to take the decision.242 In proceedings before that
competent authority, the person concerned must enjoy such
rights of defense and of assistance or representation as are pro-
vided for by the domestic law of that country.2 4 3
The Court of Justice has also held that the purpose of the
intervention of the competent authority referred to in Article
9(1) is to enable an exhaustive examination of Aill the facts and
circumstances to be carried out before the decision is finally
taken, including the expediency of the proposed measure.2 4 4
This means directly effective obligations for administrative bod-
ies in charge of public security.
D. Recognition of Foreign Diplomas
Freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services
in the common market require the recognition of professional
qualifications acquired in other Member States. Regarding Arti-
cles 52 and 59 of the EC Treaty, the Court of Justice has estab-
lished that, when the competent authorities of a Member State
receive a request to admit a person to a profession to which ac-
cess, under national law, depends on the possession of a diploma
This authority shall not be the same as that empowered to take the decision
refusing renewal of the residence permit of ordering expulsion.
2. Any decision refusing the issue of a first residence permit or ordering ex-
pulsion of the person concerned before the issue of the permit shall, where
that person so requests, be referred for consideration to the authority whose
prior opinion is required under paragraph 1. The person concerned shall
then be entitled to submit his defense in person, except where this would be
contrary to the interests of national security.
Council Directive No. 64/221/EEC, art. 9, 56J.O. 850 (1964), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1963-
64, at 117, 118-19.
242. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Gallagher,
Case C-175/94, [1995] E.C.R. 1-4253, [1996] C.M.L.R. 543.
243. Massam Dzodzi v. Belgian State, Joined Cases C-297/88 & C-197/89, [1990]
E.C.R. 1-3763, 1-3767, 1 62.
244. Regina v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, ex parte Mario Santillo, Case
131/79, [1980] E.C.R. 1585, 1599, 12, [1980] 2 C.M.L.R. 308, 328.
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or a professional qualification, such authorities have certain du-
ties. They must take into account the diplomas, certificates, and
other evidence of qualifications that the person concerned has
acquired in order to exercise the same profession in another
Member State. By making a comparison between the specialized
knowledge and the abilities certified by those diplomas and the
knowledge and qualifications required by the national rules,245
the Community has found it necessary to adopt a series of direc-
tives designed to facilitate the recognition of foreign diplo-
mas.246 Those directives contain specific obligations for all na-
tional authorities and all other bodies that are competent to is-
sue certificates acknowledging the equivalence of foreign
diplomas.
Council Directive 89/48/EEC, dated December 21, 1988,
introduced a general system for the recognition of higher-educa-
tion diplomas awarded on the completion of professional educa-
tion and training of at least three years' duration. 247 Article 3
refers to the competent authorities for the individual decisions
of recognition. Depending on the internal educational struc-
ture of each Member State, those bodies can be administrations,
schools, universities, or even professional associations. Although
Member States have to provide for the general legal framework
for the recognition of foreign diplomas, the above-mentioned
bodies have to make the individual decisions.
In addition, professional bodies must enroll the holders of
foreign diplomas in their registers. Every time national law
245. Vlassopoulou v. Ministerium fuerJustiz, Bundes-und Europaangelegenheiten,
Case C-340/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2357, 1-2375-76, 1 16; Colegio Oficial de Agentes de la
Propiedad Inmobilia v. Jose Luis Aquirre Borrell and Others, Case C-104/91, [1992]
E.C.R. 1-3003, 1-3028, 11; Kraus v. Baden-Wuerttemberg, Case C-19/92, [1993] E.C.R.
1-1689.
246. See Council Directive No. 78/686/EEC, OJ. L 233/1 (1978) (concerning mu-
tual recognition of diplomas, certificates, and other evidence of formal qualification of
practitioners of dentistry, including measures to facilitate effective exercise of right of
establishment and freedom to provide services).
247. Council Directive No. 89/48, OJ. L 131/73 (1989).
248. Nationale Rand van de Orde van Architecten v. Ulrich Egle, Case C-310/90,
[1992] E.C.R. 1-177, [1992] 2 C.M.L.R. 113; Gerhard Bauer v. Conseil National de
l'Ordre de Architectes, Case C-166/91, [1992] E.C.R. 1-2797, [1993] 1 C.M.L.R. 141.
These two cases are related to the refusal of the National Council of the Association of
Architects in Belgium to enroll two German architects in the register of architects pur-
suant to the stipulations of Article 4(1)(a) of Council Directive 85/384/EEC (1985),
OJ. L 223/15 (1985), on the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates, and other
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does not provide for a legal basis for those administrative deci-
sions, the criteria for recognition established by Community di-
rectives become the point of reference for the competent au-
thorities. One of the major problems in the application of Di-
rective 89/48 is the recognition of diplomas of unregulated
professions.
In the Aranitis case, 2 49 the plaintiff asked the Berlin City Sci-
ence and Research Department for a declaration that his Greek
diploma was equivalent to the German diploma awarded on
completion of a comparable course. The City Department con-
sidered that the applicant could not rely on the directive be-
cause it applied only to taking up regulated professions, which
did not include the profession of geologist in Germany. It au-
thorized him therefore to use the title attaching to his diploma
only in its original Greek form. In brackets, it added the literal
translation "Geologist with a Diploma. 25 0
Under Article 1 (c) of Directive 89/48, a "regulated profes-
sion" is the regulated professional activity or range of activities
that constitute that profession in a Member State. Article 1 (d)
defines "regulated professional activity" as "a professional activ-
ity, in so far as the taking up or pursuit of such activity or one of
its modes of pursuit in a Member State is subject, directly or indi-
rectly by virtue of laws, regulations or administrative provisions,
to the possession of a diploma."
In its judgment of February 1, 1996, the Court of Justice
held that Article 1 (c) and (d) of Directive 89/48/EEC provides
that a profession cannot be described as regulated when there
are no laws, regulations, or administrative provisions in the host
Member State governing the taking up or pursuit of that profes-
sion or of one of its modes of pursuit, even though the only edu-
cation and training leading to the profession consists of at least
four and one half years of higher-education studies for which a
diploma is awarded and, consequently, only persons possessing
that higher-education diploma ordinarily seek employment in
that profession.251
In 1997, the question of liability of an administrative author-
evidence of formal qualifications in architecture, including measures to facilitate the
effective exercise of the right of establishment and freedom to provide services.
249. Georgios Aranitis v. Land Berlin, Case C-164/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-135.
250. Id. at 1-152-53, 11-12.
251. Id. at 1-157-58, 32-33.
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ity as a result of a wrongful application of a directive in the field
of recognition of diplomas has been referred to the Court of
Justice. 25 2 In this case, which is pending before the Court of Jus-
tice, a German regional court has asked several questions. First,
if an official of a legally independent public law body of a Mem-
ber State breaches primary Community law when applying na-
tional law in the context of an individual decision, can the public
law body be held liable as well as the Member State? Second, if
yes, then where a national official has either applied conflicting
national law against Community law, or has applied national law
in a manner that does not comply with Community law, is there
a serious breach of Community law simply on the ground that
the official had no discretion in making his decision? Third,
where a national of another Member State has been recognized
in the host Member State as having the status of a dental practi-
tioner but does not hold a diploma mentioned in Article 3 of
Directive 78/686, may the competent authorities of the host
Member State make the admission of such person to treat pa-
tients affiliated to social security schemes conditional upon his
having the knowledge of languages that he needs for the exer-
cise of his professional activity in the host state?
The defendant authority had previously refused the plaintiff
enrollment in the register of dentists on the ground that he had
not completed the two-year preparatory training period. The
plaintiff then brought an action against that decision arguing
that there had been an infringement of the EC Treaty, which was
later referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.
In its judgment of February 9, 1994,253 the Court of Justice
held that, in examining whether the requirement under na-
tional law of a preparatory training period had been fulfilled,
the competent national body was obliged to take the plaintiff's
professional experience into account. Taking such experience
into account might include the fact that a dentist was authorized
to treat patients affiliated with social security schemes in another
Member State. In the present action, the plaintiff claims com-
pensation for the loss that he alleges that he has suffered be-
252. Salomone Haim v. Kassenzahnderztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein, Case C-
424/97, O.J. C 41/17 (1997) (pending case) [hereinafter Salomone II].
253. Salomone Haim v. Kassenzahnaerztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein, Case C-
319/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-439, [1994] 2 C.M.L.R. 169 (Salomone I).
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cause, between 1988 and 1994, his earnings were lower than
those that he could have expected had he worked as a dentist
treating patients affiliated with social security schemes.
In this case the Court ofJustice must determine whether the
plaintiff derives a right to compensation directly from Commu-
nity law. As shown above, every Member State is liable under the
EC Treaty for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result
of breaches of Community law for which the state can be held
responsible. So far the case law of the Court of Justice has dealt
only with situations of non-implementation of Community law by
national legislatures. Case C-424/97254 raises the issue of wrong-
ful administrative conduct for the first time. In this case, Ger-
many may be found liable, as may the defendant as the public
law body who made the wrongful administrative decision. The
question of whether the two may be claimed against, or whether
a claim should be made against both cumulatively, has not yet
been clarified by the Court of Justice.255
CONCLUSION: PROBLEM AREAS AND FUTURE CONFLICTS
As shown, it follows from the case law of the Court ofJustice
that where the Community authorities have, by means of a direc-
tive, placed Member States under a duty to adopt a certain
course of action, the effectiveness of such a measure would be
diminished if individuals, domestic administrations, or courts
were precluded from taking that mandate into consideration.
Consequently, a Member State that has not adopted the imple-
menting measures required by the directive within the pre-
scribed period may not plead, as against individuals, its own fail-
ure to perform the obligations that the directive entails.
Thus, wherever the provisions of a directive are, as far as
their subject-matter is concerned, unconditional and sufficiently
precise, those provisions may, in the absence of implementing
254. Salomone I, C-424/97 (pending case).
255. Ami Barav, Damages Against the State Liability for Failure to Implement EC Direc-
tives, 141 NEW L.J. 1584 (1991); Peter Duffy, Damages Against the State: A New Remedy for
Failure to Implement Community Obligations 1992, 17 EUR. L. REV. 133 (1992); Barry Fitz-
patrick & Erika Szyszczak, Remedies and Effective Judicial Protection in Community Law, 57
MOD. L. REV. 434 (1994); Francis Jacobs, Remedies in National Courts for the Enforcement of
Community Rights, in HACIA UN NUEVO ORDEN INTERNACIONAL Y EUROPEO: ESTUDIOS EN
HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR DON MANUEL DiEZ DE VELASCO (1993); HansJarass, Haftungfiir
die Verletzung von EU-Recht durch Nationale Organe und Amstrdger, 44 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT 881 (1991).
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measures adopted within the prescribed period, be relied upon
as against any national provision that is incompatible with the
directive. They may also be asserted against public authorities.
The question whether a Community provision fulfills those re-
quirements should be answered on a case-by-case basis including
the legislative history and the economic context in which those
provisions have been adopted.
Member States that have delegated law-making and adminis-
trative functions to lower authorities are required by virtue of
Articles 5 and 189 of the EC Treaty to ensure that those authori-
ties comply with the directly applicable provisions of Community
directives. Moreover, as shown by a review of the Court of Jus-
tice's case law, those regional or local bodies- are themselves
bound by Community law and might be liable if they break those
rules.
Even in Member States where no executive powers are dele-
gated to lower authorities, the very nature of many directives in
the environmental field implies that protective obligation can
only be performed on a local level. For example, Article 6(3) of
Directive 92/43/EEC of May 21, 1992, on the conservation of
natural habitats and wild fauna and flora, 25 6 prescribes that:
[a] ny plan or project not directly connected with or necessary
to the management of the site but likely to have a significant
effect thereon, either individually or in combination with
other plans or projects, shall be subject to appropriate assess-
ment of its implications for the site in view of the site's con-
servation objectives. In the light of the conclusions of the as-
sessment of the implications for the site and subject to the
provisions of paragraph 4, the competent national authorities
shall agree to the plan or project only after having ascer-
tained that it will not adversely affect the integrity of the site
concerned and, if appropriate, after having obtained the
opinion of the general public.2 57
Article 6(3) can only be properly applied by local bodies in
charge of protection of natural habitats.
As highlighted by the Court of Justice's case law regarding
Article 4 of the Wild Birds Directive, the administrative obliga-
tions in the field of habitat designation and habitat protection
256. Council Directive No. 92/43, O.J. L 206/7 (1992).
257. Id. art. 6(3), OJ. L 206/7, at 11 (1992).
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are quite clear and are capable of being implemented by compe-
tent authorities. The Court of Justice's jurisprudence has identi-
fied a number of objective criteria, such as the presence of en-
dangered species and status as an internationally recognized wet-
land, which can easily be applied by regional or local authorities.
In case of doubt, the Court of Justice has explicitly allowed the
use of scientific studies and publications in the area of fauna and
flora.
The only problem that could arise in this context is that pos-
itive protective action might not be covered by the jurisdiction of
the administrative body in charge, especially if such actions
could infringe property rights guaranteed by national constitu-
tional law. In comparison, a refusal to act, (i.e., a grant of au-
thorization for an activity that might harm birds in a special pro-
tection area), could probably be justified on the ground of the
binding direct effect of the aforementioned provision. In any
case, no invitation to act is necessary. This is to protect those
habitats that would be directly affected. The body in charge of
such habitats has to act every time that it comes across circum-
stances that might endanger the special protection area or
threaten the quality of the habitat.
Denying the binding force of Community directives in such
situations would therefore amount to admitting serious deficits
in the implementation of Community law and run counter to
the very foundations of the Community legal order.25' Because
many environmental directives contain very precise orders for
action or control that can be regulated only in a general frame-
work by domestic legislation, protective action by lower adminis-
trative entities is essential to achieving common standards of
protection in all Member States. In other words, to the extent
that a given subject matter is incapable of being implemented
through legislation only, it is the national administration to
which the mandate to give full effect to Community law applies.
In most cases, such a mandate fits into the distribution of powers
within the Member States.
The direct effect of Community law, therefore, does not
only relate to the protection of individual rights, but also ex-
258. Angela Ward, The Right to an Effective Remedy in European Community Law and
Environmental Protection, 5 J. ENVrL. L. 221 (1993); Gerd Winter, Rechtschutz gegen
Beh'rden, die Umweltrichtlinien der EG nicht beachten, 13 NATUR UND RECHT 453 (1991).
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tends to objective parameters of administrative action, especially
regarding planning authorizations or building permits. This ar-
gument finds support in the above cited Costanzo ruling in which
the Court of Justice emphasized that "if individuals ... may rely
upon provisions of a Directive before national courts, this is be-
cause the obligations following from those provisions apply to all
administrative bodies of the Member States. 259
The possibility to invoke the provision of a directive as an
individual right is therefore not the prerequisite, but simply the
result of the direct effect of such a provision. In other words,
direct effect as a mandate for administrative action is to be dis-
tinguished from the question of whether that very same direct
effect also implies the existence of individual rights. The Court
of Justice has upheld this definition of administrative responsi-
bilities in the previously cited case Commission v. Germany.26 °
It has been argued that administrative authorities cannot be
expected to comply with directives that have not been imple-
mented in the Member State because they do not have the abil-
ity to refer questions regarding the proper interpretation of
Community law to the Court of Justice. 261 Indeed, this faculty is
reserved to judicial bodies. All other avenues of information,
however, are available to national administrators to clarify
doubts about the meaning and the scope of directives.
Given the dynamics of European legal integration, all na-
tional administrators can be expected to know the relevant di-
rectives and, if necessary, the jurisprudence of the Court of Jus-
tice interpreting those instruments. Lack of knowledge of docu-
mentary resources is therefore not an adequate reason not to
apply Community law. Information and legal advice for adminis-
trative bodies are essential to enable them to apply Community
law. Because the technical enforcement of EC environmental
law begins at the local level, local authorities have a special re-
sponsibility.
Administrative action must take into account all provisions
of Community law capable of having a direct effect. 26 2 For ex-
259. Fratelli Costanzo SpA v. Comune di Milano, Case 103/88, [1989] E.C.R. 1839,
1857, 30, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 239, 258.
260. Supra note 164.
261. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Fratelli Costanzo SpA v. Comune di Mi-
lano, Case 103/88, [1989] E.C.R. 1851, 1858, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 239, 249.
262. See Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola, Commission v. Ireland, Case C-
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ample, provisions should be precise and clear enough to be ap-
plied in an individual situation. Here, interpretation of domes-
tic law, in light of the stipulations of Community law in accord-
ance with the guidelines established by the Court ofJustice, plays
a key role.
The Court of Justice has no power to inflict sanctions for
failure to comply with its judgments in the preliminary reference
procedure. It therefore depends on the implementation of its
judgments on national courts and administrative authorities.
The requirements of effective application of Community law also
extend to the operation of national rules of administrative and
judicial procedure. Procedural conditions laid down by national
law for claims based on Community rights "may not be less
favorable than those relating to similar claims" based on rights
under national law. Similarly, national procedural rules "may
not be framed so as to render virtually impossible the exercise of
rights conferred by Community law." The Court ofJustice's case
law establishes that "Community law does not preclude a na-
tional court from examining of its own motion, "261 the applica-
tion of Community law, and compatibility of national legislation
with its requirements.
It follows from the case law that administrative authorities
must disregard or leave unapplied all those rules of domestic law
that are in conflict with provisions of directives that are suffi-
ciently clear and precise in their scope. Also, where domestic
law is ambiguous or open to interpretation, or where it contains
explicit mandates for administrative bodies to fill in the gaps,
those entities have to use their powers according to the direc-
tions given by Community law, including the Court of Justice's
case law.
Administrative authorities must be held responsible for in-
terpreting these rules in conformity with the purposes of the di-
rective. Although this might result in a certain degree of legal
uncertainty, it is the duty of administrative bodies to make deter-
minations as to whether the procedures established by the direc-
tive have to be followed. In making this decision, the Commu-
392/96, Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola (ECJ, delivered Dec. 17, 1998) (Court
decision not yet issued) (regarding action for failure to ensure proper transposition of
Directive 85/337).
263. Verholen and Others v. Sociale Verzekeringsbank, Joined Cases 87, 89/90,
[1991] E.C.R. 1-3757, 1-3789, 16, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 157, 181.
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nity definition should prevail over national definition. Of
course, any administrative decision is subject to judicial review by
domestic courts and the Court of Justice under the preliminary
reference procedure.
The fact that by way of direct application of Community law,
rights or legal expectations of third parties may be affected can-
not lead to different results. As demonstrated above, Commu-
nity law supercedes conflicting national laws. Also, third parties
are supposed to know the scope and the meaning of Community
law, especially in the field of common market rules, such as di-
rectives on public procurement. For example, the Court of Jus-
tice has emphasized that legitimate expectations recognized
under national law may not be-invoked against Community rules
in the area of state subsidies.264 Third parties may therefore not
rely upon the concept of legal certainty to claim the exclusive
application of national law.
From a legal point of view, environmental and public con-
tracts directives require new approaches and innovations in
many states. Directive 85/337 is probably the best example of
these challenges. This is evidenced by numerous domestic legal
controversies about the legislative procedure to be applied, the
implementation procedure, and the determination of the com-
petent authorities, especially in states with advanced legal sys-
tems. This directive shows that it is above all those states with a
highly differentiated legal system that face technical legal
problems when transposing and applying Community legisla-
tion.
Another open question is whether domestic law allows ad-
ministrative authorities to overrule national law for the benefit
of Community law. In Germany, for example, opinions are di-
vided as to whether administrative bodies are entitled not to ap-
ply provisions that in their legal analysis violate superior rules of
law and, if not, what are the ways and means to obtain a determi-
nation on the legal problem involved. Legal scholarship in Ger-
many is divided over the problem of whether administrative bod-
ies enjoy a Venverfungsbefugnis.265 In other words, scholars ques-
tion the right of administrative bodies to refuse to apply a law
264. Land Rheinland-Pfalz v. Alcan Deutschland GmbH, Case C-24/95, [1997]
E.C.R. 1-1591, 1-1623, 54, [1997] 2 C.M.L.R. 1034, 1059.
265. Translation: Right to ignore or to overrule a legal provision.
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that they consider to be unconstitutional. Under Article 101 of
the German Constitution, courts may refer such a question to
the Federal Constitutional Court. The academic discussion in
Germany has little practical relevance due to the efficient ma-
chinery of judicial review, which normally answers all questions
regarding possible conflicts between national legislation and the
constitution.
Even if administrative authorities were entitled, under Ger-
man constitutional law, to overrule conflicting domestic law and
to apply Community provisions, the problem remains as to
whether it can be expected from an individual official to act in
such a way. The official might be subject to disciplinary meas-
ures if he fails to follow domestic law. It might be too much to
ask a local official to choose between conflicting legal options,
especially if the official is bound by internal instructions.
The question is whether in the case of application of a stat-
ute contrary to Community law, the official has the same room
to maneuver as the legislature does. The line between a case in
which a statute contrary to Community law is to remain unap-
plied and a case in which a statute, despite its wording to the
contrary, must be interpreted in accordance with Community
law, is an extremely fluid one. Another factor to be taken into
account is that in case of administrative decisions in individual
cases, in determining whether a serious breach has occurred, ref-
erence must be made to the complexity of the facts considered
by the body in question, difficulties in applying the regulations,
and the question whether the contested decision was based on
an erroneous, but excusable, interpretation or an inexcusable
mistake.
The state is bound to pay compensation for unlawful acts or
omissions of its bodies in the exercise of their administrative
functions. It is not, however, possible as a rule for acts and omis-
sions of state bodies in the exercise of the legislative task of the
state to set in motion the mechanism whereby the state incurs
civil liability where such acts are issued or such omissions
brought about by bodies of the legislative authority or by execu-
tive bodies especially empowered for that purpose, that is, unless
those acts or omissions affect the constitutionally protected per-
sonal or social rights of those administered.
All national legal systems recognize that administrative au-
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thorities acting within their area of jurisdiction are entitled and,
in fact, are required to evaluate all aspects of law before taking a
decision. This must include Community law.2 66 In certain areas,
such as tax law, administrative authorities are even capable of
laying down general rules of application. The area of discussion
only concerns the question of to what extent administrative au-
thorities are entitled to decide against the written law. Constitu-
tional law, especially by order of higher authorities, is probably
not at the disposition of administrative authorities. Also,
problems arise when mandates of Community law require posi-
tive action that might not be covered by the scope of jurisdiction
of the entity concerned.
These are the most important questions that the case law of
the Court ofJustice has yet to address. The United States' expe-
rience in this field and its definition of hard core state sover-
eignty could provide beneficial guidelines for the European
Union.2 6 7 The question of whether there are limits mandating
state officials is still unanswered. Further clarification can only
be provided by a case-by-case analysis from the Court of Justice.
The author hopes that the present study makes a contribution to
the discussion of this issue.
266. Commission v. Greece, Joined Cases C-232-33/95, [1998] E.C.R. 1-3343; Com-
mission v. Luxemburg, Case C-206/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-3401.
267. Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEXAS L. REv. 795,
831-36 (1996); Theodor Schilling, A New Dimension of Subsidiary: Subsidiary as a Rule and
a Principle, 14 Y.B. EuR. L. 203 (1994).
